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LEAD ARTICLE
TWO-SIDED INTERNET MARKETS
AND THE NEED TO ASSESS BOTH
UPSTREAM AND DOWNSTREAM IMPACTS
ROB FRIEDEN*
This Article explains how information, communications, and entertainment
companies can acquire market dominance by erecting a platform serving both
downstream consumers and upstream ventures via broadband networks.
Operating in a two-sided market, these intermediaries can achieve fast growth
as they serve diverse geographical markets without having to erect or lease all the
infrastructure needed to reach end users. Intermediaries can quickly grow by
accruing positive networking externalities and offering attractive services,
thereby creating incentives to subscribe.
Intermediary platform operators have thrived in a largely deregulated
marketplace based on the assumption that consumers have benefitted without
the need for government oversight. However, the court of public opinion may
have begun to shift from the view that platform operators present a universally
positive value proposition. A proper assessment of consumer welfare must
balance downstream enhancements, which are achieved through convenience,
cost savings, free-rider opportunities, and innovation, with upstream costs,
including uncompensated consumer data collection, privacy intrusions, reduced
or eliminated consumer surpluses, and harm to information, communications,
entertainment, and technology ventures. Such assessment also must take into
consideration the earnings, employability, and stability of the workforce
operating within the “gig economy.”
This Article explains how many of the platform intermediaries most likely to
harm consumers and competition have benefitted by a reluctance of government

* Pioneers Chair and Professor of Telecommunications and Law, Penn State University.

713

714

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 68:713

agencies to examine upstream impacts. Such reticence stems from legitimate
concerns about overreach, mission creep, and jurisdiction. It also may represent
prudent concerns that the government should not handicap successful ventures
at the expense of other market entrants. Concentrating on consumer impact
steers agencies and reviewing courts toward a downstream emphasis because
consumers reside on that side of the two-sided market. Additionally, a court
might consider the relevant market as limited solely to one side.
On the other hand, this Article explains that upstream market assessments
will become essential for a complete and statutorily-compliant evidentiary record.
This Article examines the disagreement reflected in Ohio v. American Express
Co. about whether the relevant market for credit card services requires courts to
examine the transactions occurring on both sides of a platform that links
vendors and consumers. The Supreme Court has validated the need to examine
both sides of an intermediary’s market platform to determine the combined effects
on consumers and competition when a credit card issuer tries to impose a
contractual prohibition on upstream merchants “steering” consumers to an
alternative credit card that offers lower processing fees. The lower court rejected the
language as potentially raising consumer costs without considering whether such
terms might accrue consumer benefits, such as financial rebates and airline miles.
This Article concludes that two-sided markets require assessments of the
potential competitive and consumer benefits as well as the harms occurring on
both sides in antitrust court and other regulatory proceedings. This approach
does not favor more extensive government oversight, but instead supports a better
calibrated assessment of the impact on competition and consumers.
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INTRODUCTION
Many market segments in the large information, communications, and
entertainment ecosystem have a dominant venture serving as an
intermediary between upstream ventures—such as content creators,
video programming aggregators, and software vendors—and downstream
consumers.1
With the successful development of a platform,
intermediaries can serve a large percentage of the total number of
available downstream users without having to install and operate all the
broadband networks needed to switch, route, and deliver content.2 These
ventures can accrue what economists term “positive network[ing]
externalities,”3 where the overall value in a network and its ability to
generate consumer benefits grows as more users participate. Broadband
platform operators can quickly serve a global consumer population and
convince prospective customers of the benefits in joining the

1. See, e.g., Kenneth A. Bamberger & Orly Lobel, Platform Market Power, 32
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1051, 1052–54, 1069–70 (2017); Linda M. Khan, Amazon’s Antitrust
Paradox, 126 YALE L.J. 710, 774–76 (2017); Orly Lobel, The Law of the Platform, 101 MINN.
L. REV. 87, 94–101 (2016).
2. There is a split between edge providers and end users over “‘who should pay
who’ in interconnection arrangements”—edge providers contend that end users who
pull data, such as Broadband Service Providers (BSPs), have the responsibility to
ensure accessibility to data that will accommodate their requests, while BSPs claim that
the duty to ensure data is in a reliable and usable form rests on edge providers. John
Meisel, Reactions by Broadband Service Providers to the Growth of Video Streaming, 22 COMMLAW
CONSPECTUS 267, 277 (2014); see also William Lehr & Douglas Sicker, Would You like Your
Internet With or Without Video?, 2017 U. ILL. J.L., TECH. & POL’Y 73, 103–06 (2017).
3. See Herbert Hovenkamp, Post-Chicago Antitrust: A Review and Critique, 2001
COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 257, 300 (2001) (highlighting the classic example of a positive
network externality—the telephone system—where its worth is derived from the
growth of interconnections forged over time); Mike Moffatt, Introduction to Network
Externalities, THOUGHTCO. (Mar. 17, 2017), https://www.thoughtco.com/intro
duction-to-network-externalities-1146145 (explaining that positive network
externalities become more beneficial to consumers as the number of users increases
(e.g., Facebook); in contrast to negative network externalities, which become less
beneficial as their consumer base increases).
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bandwagon.4 Early mover success can quickly lead to “winner take all”
market dominance,5 despite the availability of alternatives.6
Platform intermediaries can generate a compelling value position
for consumers by opting to recover most, if not all costs, from upstream
users, rather than split the financial burden between both upstream
and downstream participants.7 Economists use the term two-sided
markets8 to identify platform functions where transactions occur both
upstream and downstream from the intermediary.9 Successful
insertion of an intermediary platform has generated both positive and
negative impacts on consumer welfare, competition, rate of

4. See, e.g., Micah L. Sifry, In Facebook We Antitrust, NATION (Oct. 12, 2017),
https://www.thenation.com/article/in-facebook-we-antitrust.
5. Khan, supra note 1, at 785 (recognizing that the “winner take all” dominance is
most prevalent in online platform markets because network effects and control over data
acquired early on become self-reinforcing over time—leading to market dominance by
a small number of firms, which is illustrated by Walmart’s recent purchase of Jet.com);
see also Jonathan M. Barnett, The Host’s Dilemma: Strategic Forfeiture in Platform Markets for
Informational Goods, 124 HARV. L. REV. 1861, 1876 (2011) (noting that the general need
to “trigger and maintain positive feedback effects” in order to succeed is augmented in
“winner take all” markets where users tend to only use, or not use, one single platform
at a time); Nathan Newman, Search, Antitrust, and the Economics of the Control of User Data,
31 YALE J. ON REG. 401, 413 (2014) [hereinafter Economics of Control] (“Google’s rise was
facilitated by an array of exclusive contracts that, given the seeming winner-take-all
nature of the search advertising market, should be evaluated by antitrust authorities as a
potential exercise in illegal foreclosure by the company.”).
6. Des Traynor, Surviving and Thriving in Two-Sided Markets, INSIDE INTERCOM
(Aug. 14, 2012), https://blog.intercom.com/surviving-thriving-in-two-sided-markets
(“Winner-takes-all markets are high risk and high reward. The losers crash and burn
while the winner is left with a lucrative legal monopoly.”).
7. Julie E. Cohen, Law for the Platform Economy, 51 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 133, 146
(2017) (explaining that the relationships forged through the platform intermediaries
are unique in that they are “two- or multi-sided: they serve buyers, the sellers seeking
to reach them, and often advertisers seeking the buyers’ attention” and that the terms
of each relationship can be defined differently).
8. Two-sided markets operate when the amount of transactions effectuated between
end-users depends on both the structure and level of fees charged by the platform which
simultaneously impact both sides’ willingness to trade. Jean-Charles Rochet & Jean Tirole,
Two-Sided Markets: A Progress Report, 37 RAND J. ECON. 645, 646 (2006).
9. See DAVID S. EVANS & RICHARD SCHMALENSEE, MATCHMAKERS: THE NEW
ECONOMICS OF MULTISIDED PLATFORMS 45–48 (2016) [hereinafter EVANS &
SCHMALENSEE, MATCHMAKERS]; David S. Evans & Richard Schmalensee, The New
Economics of Multisided Platforms:
A Guide to the Vocabulary 7 (2016),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2793021 [hereinafter Evans &
Schmalensee, Vocabulary]; Lapo Filistrucchi et al., Market Definition in Two-Sided Markets:
Theory and Practice, 10 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 293, 296–99 (2014).
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innovation, employment, and other key factors.10 On the positive side,
intermediaries can promote efficiency, economies of scale,11 and
beneficial network externalities. On the negative side, intermediaries
may leverage dominant market shares to extract high prices from both
upstream and downstream participants after acquiring market
dominance through a sustained period of below market pricing.12
Additionally, they can erect barriers to market entry, acquire insurgent
companies, and use comparative advantages to dominate in both core
and related markets, such as the collection, processing, and sale of “Big
Data”13 about subscriber behavior.14
Intermediaries attempt to maximize market share in their decisions
about cost recovery.15 Consumers may think platform operators offer
“free”16 or subsidized services by appearing to recover all costs from

10. See generally Hermant K. Bhargava & Vidyanand Choudhary, Economics of an
Information Intermediary with Aggregation Benefits 1–3 (eBus. Res. Ctr. Working Paper,
2003); Benjamin Edelman, Mastering the Intermediaries, HARV. BUS. REV. (2014),
https://hbr.org/2014/06/mastering-the-intermediaries.
11. See generally Economies of Scale, WIKIDOT (May 2, 2011, 10:19 AM),
http://ibiz.wikidot.com/economies-of-scale (“A firm exhibits economies of scale if the
average cost of producing a good falls as the quantity produced rises. . . . Many
internet businesses exhibit large economies of scale, because many of their costs are
fixed. For example, many of eBay’s costs come from servers and software
development, and these do not increase with the number of customers. Every
additional transaction lowers the average cost of a transaction.”).
12. See Edelman, supra note 10.
13. The term “Big Data” refers to data that “can only be analyzed through the
establishment of a unique platform that can manage substantial volumes of
information in a reasonable timeframe.” See Daniel L. Rubinfeld & Michal S. Gal,
Access Barriers to Big Data, 59 ARIZ. L. REV. 339, 345 (2017); Max N. Helveston, Consumer
Protection in the Age of Big Data, 93 WASH. U. L. REV. 859, 861 (2016) (explaining that
Big Data will “provide businesses with insights about their customers, enabling them
to tailor their practices to better satisfy consumers and identify ways to increase the
efficiency of their operations”); see also Solon Barocas & Andrew D. Selbst, Big Data’s
Disparate Impact, 104 CALIF. L. REV. 671, 673–74 (2016).
14. Laura Palk & Krishnamurty Muralidhar, A Free Ride: Data Brokers’ Rent-Seeking
Behavior and the Future of Data Inequality, 20 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 779, 794 (2018)
(noting that while data mining helps predict future behaviors, which is highly valuable
to the economy, this added value is at the “extreme expense of unwitting users and the
research community”); see also David S. Evans, Attention Rivalry Among Online Platforms,
9 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 313, 338–39 (2013).
15. See, e.g., Natascha Just, Governing Online Platforms: Competition Policy in Times of
Platformization, 42 TELECOMM. POL’Y 386, 387 (2018) (recognizing that the coordination
between platforms highlights the importance of the overall price structure).
16. See John M. Newman, Antitrust in Zero-Price Markets: Foundations, 164 U. PA. L.
REV. 149, 151 (2015) [hereinafter Newman, Zero-Price Markets] (explaining that
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upstream ventures.17 While consumers do have to pay for products and
services, of which the advertising costs and other subsidies generate
higher prices, consumers embrace marketing promotions that offer
real or perceived subsidies.18 In exchange for free or below cost
services, consumers allow intermediaries to compile information about
their online behavior, location, purchases, searches, website visits, and
other activities, which is then used by data analytics firms and
advertisers to improve targeting of commercial advertisements.19
Privacy intrusions20 and the commodification of consumer behavior
generate significant value that a platform operator can use to generate
revenues in ways that most subscribers may not fully understand or quantify.21
This Article asserts that any analysis of costs and benefits occurring via
broadband intermediary transactions necessitates an assessment of
impacts occurring on both sides of the platform. Heretofore, legislators,
judges, regulators, policy makers, business executives, and academics
have solely examined or emphasized the downstream impacts.22 This
focus appears prudent because consumers, who vote with dollars, are
situated downstream. Likewise, the most immediate and measurable

antitrust law has yet to “develop an adequate response to zero-price markets” and that
the advent of the internet has increased the use of zero-price products, making the
current combined market capitalization easily exceed $1 trillion); see also David S.
Evans, The Antitrust Economics of Free, 7 COMPETITION POL’Y INT’L 71, 72–74 (2011); Chris
Jay Hoofnagle & Jan Whittington, Free: Accounting for the Costs of the Internet’s Most
Popular Price, 61 UCLA L. REV. 606, 608–09 (2014).
17. Steven Semeraro, Assessing the Competitive Effects of Surcharging the Use of Payment
Mechanisms, 26 U. MIAMI BUS. L. REV. 29, 37 (2018) (emphasizing that to obtain an
efficient output level in a two-sided market, producers “must charge the customer set
that is more sensitive to price less than marginal cost of serving that customer (effectively
enabling those consumers to internalize the benefits to both sides of the market)”).
18. See, e.g., id. at 42–44 (highlighting the delicate balance of a company’s ability
to actually render benefits to cardholders).
19. See Howard A. Shelanski, Information, Innovation, and Competition Policy for the
Internet, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 1663, 1678 (2013) (distinguishing the value of consumer
information to digital platforms from other businesses because of the platforms’
greater access to consumer data and processing ability of digital platforms).
20. Frank Pasquale, Privacy, Antitrust, and Power, 20 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1009, 1010
(2013) [hereinafter Pasquale, Privacy, Antitrust, and Power] (noting that while it would
be ideal if market forces promoted optimal levels of privacy for consumers, this is not
the reality in today’s era of Big Data because “every business has an incentive to be
nosy in order to maximize profits”).
21. See Shelanski, supra note 19, at 1690–91.
22. See Rob Frieden, The Internet of Platforms and Two-Sided Markets: Implications for
Competition and Consumers, 63 VILL. L. REV. 269, 313–14 (2018).
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consequences may appear on the downstream side.23 Considering the
decision by intermediaries to shift costs upstream, analysts of two-sided
markets may overestimate consumer benefits by failing to consider
offsetting costs occurring when upstream transactions are examined.24
The predisposition to concentrate on consumer impacts and
identify welfare enhancement has existed well before the onset of
internet-based intermediaries. For example, credit card vendors have
offered subsidies, including cash rebates, to consumers even if they pay
on time and trigger no offsetting interest charge.25 Free to radio and
television, broadcasters have offered consumers the opportunity for
“free rider” consumption of content, without the obligation to purchase
any of the goods and services advertised by upstream vendors.26
This Article demonstrates how a dual analysis of both downstream
and upstream impacts can result in a better calibrated impact
assessment. In some cases, apparent harm to consumers and
competition, such a contractual prohibition on vendors steering
customers to credit cards with lower vendor fees, can be offset by

23. See Allen St. John, Facebook Breach Exposed Personal Data of Millions of Users,
CONSUMER REP. (Oct. 12, 2018), https://www.consumerreports.org/digitalsecurity/facebook-data-breach-exposed-personal-data-of-millions-of-users (exemplifying
how downstream consumers can be severely injured by the actions of intermediaries).
24. See Frieden, supra note 22, at 279–81, 290, 320.
25. For background on credit card platform intermediaries, see, for example,
Lloyd Constantine et al., In re Visa Check/MasterMoney Antitrust Litigation: A Study of
Market Failure in a Two-Sided Market, 2005 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 599, 605–10 (2005);
David S. Evans & Richard Schmalensee, Applying the Rule of Reason to Two-Sided Platform
Businesses, 26 U. MIAMI BUS. L. REV. 1, 5–6 (2018); David S. Evans, It Takes Two to Tango:
The Economics of Two-Sided Markets, 1 PAYMENT CARD ECON. REV. 1, 3–4 (2003); Benjamin
Klein et al., Competition in Two-Sided Markets: The Antitrust Economics of Payment Card
Interchange Fees, 73 ANTITRUST L.J. 571, 571–77 (2006); Adam J. Levitin, Priceless? The
Economic Costs of Credit Card Merchant Restraints, 55 UCLA L. REV. 1321, 1326–27 (2008);
Timothy J. Muris, Payment Card Regulation and the (Mis)Application of the Economics of
Two-Sided Markets, 2005 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 515, 517–22 (2005); Jean-Charles Rochet
& Jean Tirole, Cooperation Among Competitors: Some Economics of Payment Card
Associations, 33 RAND J. ECON. 549, 551–52 (2002); Richard Schmalensee, Payment
Systems and Interchange Fees, 50 J. INDUS. ECON. 103, 115 (2002); Steven Semeraro,
Assessing the Costs & Benefits of Credit Card Rewards: A Response to Who Gains and Who
Loses from Credit Card Payments? Theory and Calibrations, 25 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 30,
38–39 (2012); Steven Semeraro, Credit Card Interchange Fees: Three Decades of Antitrust
Uncertainty, 14 GEO. MASON L. REV. 941, 947–49 (2007); Steven Semeraro, The ReverseRobin-Hood-Cross-Subsidy Hypothesis: Do Credit Card Systems Tax the Poor and Reward the
Rich?, 40 RUTGERS L.J. 419, 422–27 (2009).
26. See Gregory P. Magarian, Forward into the past: Speech Intermediaries in the
Television and Internet Ages, 71 OKLA. L. REV. 237, 243 (2018).
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consumer and competitive benefits, e.g., diversification of credit card
types including ones offering rebates and airline miles.27 In other
instances, so-called false negative findings of no harm to consumers
and competition can be corrected with the identification of
detrimental impacts, particularly on the often-unexamined upstream
side of the market.28
Countervailing proof of harm may result from an assessment of the
marketplace and consumer impact in upstream commercial
transactions occurring directly and indirectly with downstream
consumers. For example, consumers agree to intermediary mining,
analysis, and sale of data about their wants, needs, interests,
consumptive behavior, website visits, purchases, location, and internet
searches.29 This data has value that subsidizes the “free” access to
content and other services.30 Upstream vendors and intermediaries
also can use data mining31 to make frequent changes to their prices for
goods and services.32 Such calibration has the potential to eliminate
or reduce consumer surplus, which occurs when the charged price falls
below what a consumer willingly would pay.33 Simply put, the value
proposition of what broadband intermediaries offer combines both
costs and benefits, and thus requires an assessment of both factors by
consumers and government agencies that have jurisdiction to oversee
the potential for harm to consumers and markets.
This Article identifies reasons the upstream impact analysis does not
occur and provides recommendations on what consumers and
governments should do to reduce or eliminate direct and indirect harms.

27. See, e.g., Ohio v. Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. 2274, 2280 (2018) (explaining the
additional benefits that American Express cardholders have including deferring
payments, making purchases without cash, and rewards for airline miles).
28. See Evans & Schmalensee, supra note 25, at 9.
29. Internet platforms “generate, collect, process and aggregate big data” of
competitors and individuals through algorithmic methods “in order to extract
economic value.” Just, supra note 15, at 391.
30. See Newman, Zero-Price Markets, supra note 16, at 172–73.
31. “When used by a layman, the term data mining likely refers to a ‘[t]ype of
database analysis that attempts to discover useful patterns or relationships in a group of
data’ or ‘us[e of] mathematical formulas to sift through large sets of data to discover
patterns and predict future behavior.’” Liane Colonna, A Taxonomy and Classification of
Data Mining, 16 SMU SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 309, 310 (2013) (internal citations omitted).
32. See Swati Aggarwal, What Data Scientists at Uber Are Doing with Your Data, GREAT
LEARNING (Nov. 10, 2017), https://www.greatlearning.in/blog/data-scientists-uber-data.
33. See generally id.
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I. TWO-SIDED MARKETS IN THE DIGITAL BROADBAND ECOSYSTEM
Two-sided markets have operated in the economy for many centuries,
well before the onset of the internet and broadband networks.34 Recent
examples include advertiser subsidized access to newspapers and
broadcast media, wireless smartphone operating systems, commercial
aviation reservation systems, dating matchmakers, and travel agencies.35
Conversion of analog telecommunications infrastructure into high-speed
broadband networks, fast processing computers, cheap and high capacity
memory and data storage, and other technological innovations have led
to a proliferation of platform intermediaries as well as the potential for
them to achieve remarkably quick financial success.36 Companies such as
Airbnb, Alibaba, Amazon, Didi Chuxing, Facebook, Google, Netflix,
Tencent, Twitter, and Uber have quickly achieved “unicorn” status with
over $1 billion in market value.37
The internet ecosystem favors two-sided market platforms because
intermediaries can offer faster, better, smarter, cheaper, and more
convenient solutions to consumers’ wants, needs, and desires than
what traditional “bricks and mortar” ventures offer.38 By interconnecting
with broadband networks, digital platform operators can establish a
global service footprint without having to invest startup funds on
content distribution networks.39 Two-sided market ventures are
optimally suited to exploit the positive networking externalities available
from widespread availability and robust consumer adoption.40 Likewise,

34. Two-Sided Market, INVESTOPEDIA, https://www.investopedia.com/terms/t/twosidedmarket.asp (last visited Feb. 5, 2019) (providing the yellow page telephone
directory as an example of a two-sided market).
35. See id.
36. See Frieden, supra note 22, at 271 (explaining how cost efficiency advantages
benefit internet services); Uta Kohl, Google: The Rise and Rise of Online Intermediaries in
the Governance of the Internet and Beyond (Part 2), 21 INT’L J.L. & INFO. TECH. 187, 187–88,
223 (2013) (describing the difficulties of regulating internet intermediaries because
their success and innovation is based on algorithms and data).
37. See The Unicorn List (2016), FORTUNE, http://fortune.com/unicorns (last visited
Feb. 5, 2019) (“They’re called ‘unicorns’—private companies valued at $1 billion or more.
The billion-dollar technology startup was once the stuff of myth. Today they’re seemingly
everywhere, backed by a bull market and a new generation of disruptive technology.”).
38. See Pasquale, Privacy, Antitrust, and Power, supra note 20, at 1010 (discussing how
internet intermediaries have an incentive to collect Big Data to determine consumer needs).
39. Frieden, supra note 22, at 269–71.
40. Id. at 312–13.

722

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 68:713

digital platforms can take advantage of first mover opportunities to
acquire large market share and subscribership quickly.41
A major business model for internet-mediated platforms masterfully
uses flexibility in pricing to create the impression by prospective
subscribers that their access to valuable content and services can occur
without payment.42 Intermediary platforms can calibrate who pays
and, in most instances, the direct payment of financial compensation
comes primarily or exclusively from upstream ventures, such as
advertisers.43 Advertising rates and other revenues can defray or
eliminate the need for platform operators to require monetary
payment from downstream subscribers.44 Of course, consumers bear
an obligation to provide something of great value: consent to the
acquisition, processing, and marketing of data about their wants,
needs, desires, web travels, location, interests, searches, etc.45 Most
platform users may underestimate the value of the privacy invading
consumer data they relinquish freely.46
Many of the internet unicorns, operating a digital platform, rely on
advertiser subsidies, broadband network distribution, and the
convergence of content and conduit to package a desirable internetmediated service, such as social networking.47 Digital platform
operators surely enhance consumer welfare and offer a compelling
value proposition as evidenced by their marketplace success.48
However, these ventures do not operate as charities and their
extraordinary market values reflects their current or prospective ability
41. Id. at 313.
42. See, e.g., Newman, Zero-Price Markets, supra note 16, at 154–57 (explaining
sustainable zero-price strategies such as “tying,” multisided platforms, and “freemiums”).
43. See Newman, Economics of Control, supra note 5, at 403–06.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 439, 448 (explaining that the FTC has suggested that companies such as
Google obtain express consent for usage of consumer data).
46. Id. at 441–43 (describing the various consumer costs of freely relinquishing
one’s personal information).
47. See, e.g., Ben Gilbert, How Facebook Makes Money from Your Data, in Mark
Zuckerberg’s
Words,
BUS.
INSIDER
(Apr.
11,
2018,
10:25
AM),
https://www.businessinsider.com/how-facebook-makes-money-according-to-markzuckerberg-2018-4 (describing how Facebook makes its profit through advertising sales
by placing the ads for the advertisers to preclude compromising user data).
48. See, e.g., Elizabeth Dwoskin, Facebook Profit Hits an All-Time High, Unaffected by
Recent Scandals—So Far, WASH. POST (Apr. 25, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com
/news/the-switch/wp/2018/04/25/facebook-profit-hits-an-all-time-high-unaffected-b
y-recent-scandals-so-far (describing how even with consumer privacy concerns,
Facebook’s first-quarter revenue “grew by [forty-nine] percent to $12 billion”).
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to accrue massive profits, largely from their ability to mine, analyze,
collate, and market consumer data.49
To acquire a full appreciation of broadband intermediary costs and
benefits to consumers, one should examine the transactions that occur
on both sides of the platform. For example, downstream subscribers may
benefit from access to “free” content, but at a possibly substantial cost
considering the effect of upstream data analysts, brokers and advertisers,
as well as election meddlers, provocateurs, and purveyors of “fake news.”50
II. CONSUMER WELFARE GAINS FROM TWO-SIDED MARKETS
Two-sided markets offer many benefits to consumers, largely because
upstream ventures willingly pay intermediaries that in turn subsidize
downstream access.51 Having no direct financial payment to make,
consumers may assume they pay nothing for opportunities to participate
in beneficial transactions. For example, the legacy credit card model52
offers users the opportunity to purchase products and services without
point of sale cash payments, a benefit in terms of both convenience and
the opportunity to acquire a short-term loan without interest.53
Information, communications, and entertainment intermediaries
provide access to many different types of software, applications, services,
and diverse content, typically without requiring any direct payment.54 A
mutually beneficial transaction combines ample benefits for platform

49. E.g., Prableen Bajpai, How Uber is Selling all Your Ride Data, INVESTOPEDIA (Mar.
9, 2016, 7:35 AM), https://www.investopedia.com/articles/investing/030916/howuber-uses-its-data-bank.asp.
50. Alexandra Andorfer, Note, Spreading like Wildfire: Solutions for Abating the Fake
News Problem on Social Media via Technology Controls and Government Regulation, 69
HASTINGS L.J. 1409, 1411 (2018) (explaining that while the term “fake news” was
brought to light during the November 2016 election, the concept has been an issue
for years with politicians overstating and embellishing statistics); see also Lee Rainie et
al., The Future of Free Speech, Trolls, Anonymity and Fake News Online, PEW RES. CTR. (Mar.
29, 2017), http://www.pewinternet.org/2017/03/29/the-future-of-free-speech-trollsanonymity-and-fake-news-online.
51. Newman, Zero-Price Markets, supra note 16, at 156.
52. Id. at 156–57 (noting that the ability of loyalty cardholders to pay zero or even be
re-paid through loyalty points for using the services provided is balanced by the value of
the acquired consumer information which is then sold to advertisers or data seekers).
53. See, e.g., Ohio v. Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. 2274, 2280 (2018).
54. See Just, supra note 15, at 387–88 (providing Google Maps as an example of a
free service subsidized by advertisements).
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operators and consumers by updating the pre-existing model of subsidized
access to services and content.55
Digital broadband platform operators can afford such generosity
because they extract a form of payment from downstream consumers who
may not fully appreciate the value of what they relinquish, but who willingly
do so through a binding contractual commitment.56 Even as platform
subscribers underestimate the value of what they must allow upstream
ventures to use, the intermediary model has thrived and proliferated.57
The massive increase in platform subscriptions helps broadband
intermediaries quickly acquire scale economies58 and efficiency gains
by attracting growing numbers of users and spreading costs over an
ever-increasing population of users.59 The incremental cost for serving
additional participants approaches zero because information,
communications, and entertainment platforms have high initial
investment costs but very low incremental costs incurred when adding
users.60 Broadband intermediaries also can accrue positive networking
externalities61 as subscribership grows. When intermediaries reach a
55. Benjamin Edelman, How to Launch Your Digital Platform, HARV. BUS. REV.
(2015), https://hbr.org/2015/04/how-to-launch-your-digital-platform (explaining
how internet intermediaries launch new services and content through automatically
enrolling their current users).
56. See David Glance, How Facebook Uses the ‘Privacy Paradox’ to Keep Users Sharing,
CONVERSATION (Apr. 15, 2018, 4:00 PM), https://theconversation.com/how-facebookuses-the-privacy-paradox-to-keep-users-sharing-94779 (arguing that consumers are
“unwilling to take actual steps to protect themselves” because “privacy is an abstract
feeling” and people struggle to place an absolute value on it); Just, supra note 15, at
391 (explaining that internet platforms “extract economic value” from data).
57. See Lobel, supra note 1, at 89 (stressing the scope of the “digital platform revolution”).
58. Scale economies refer to the ability of a single firm to produce a good or
service at the lowest per unit cost. “For nearly 100 years, microeconomic theory said
that widespread access to telephone technology was more likely if there was only one
telephone company, because of economies of scale resulting in what economists call
‘natural monopoly.’” Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Keeping the Internet Invisible: Television Takes
over, 21 J. TECH. L. & POL’Y 121, 127 (2017).
59. See Joseph Farrell & Garth Saloner, Standardization, Compatibility, and
Innovation, 16 RAND J. ECON. 70, 70–71 (1985) (noting that standardized or compatible
goods may have a “market-mediated effect,” as these goods become more readily
available and cheaper).
60. See John M. Newman, Anticompetitive Product Design in the New Economy, 39 FLA.
ST. U. L. REV. 681, 687 (2012) [hereinafter Anticompetitive Product Design] (explaining
that digital markets and their positive network externalities result in high fixed costs
and low variable costs).
61. See id. at 688–89 (explaining that positive networking externalities occur when
“the value to each individual consumer increases with the number of other individuals
who use the same network”). Newman uses the telephone network as an example,
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critical mass of popularity, non-users see the advantages in joining the
bandwagon, further enhancing the comparative attractiveness of the most
popular platform operator vis-à-vis other competitors and options.62
III. CONSUMER COSTS FROM TWO-SIDED MARKETS
Unmeasured and often unrecognized costs offset readily
identifiable, if overstated, benefits from two-sided platforms. In the
short term, ventures like Amazon enhance consumer welfare by
offering a growing inventory of products and services at lower prices,
which is the product of operational efficiencies and the willingness to
eschew profits in exchange for increasing market share and “shelfspace.”63 Similarly, advertiser-provided subsidies help create the
impression among most consumers that they have more to gain in
terms of “free” access to content, and even subscribers, who recognize
the value in commodifying and selling their data, may perceive the
benefits as exceeding the indirect costs.64
Most consumers may not fully understand both the short- and longterm consequences of intermediary transactions,65 particularly in terms
of not easily quantified gains accruing to upstream ventures and
platform operators, at least partially at the expense of downstream

providing that as the amount of telephone users increased, the more valuable the
telephone became to the single, individual user. See id.
62. See Farrell & Saloner, supra note 59, at 70 (explaining that a “consumer’s value
for a good increases when another consumer has a compatible good”); Michael L.
Katz. & Carl Shapiro, Network Externalities, Competition, and Compatibility, 75 AM. ECON.
REV. 424, 425 (1985) (arguing that if consumers expect a seller to be dominant, then
they are willing to pay more for the seller’s good); Mark A. Lemley & David McGowan,
Legal Implications of Network Economic Effects, 86 CALIF. L. REV. 479, 546 (1998) (providing
that the “bandwagon network effect” occurs when consumers want to be connected to
the same network as everyone else).
63. See David Streitfeld, As Competition Wanes, Amazon Cuts Back Discounts, N.Y. TIMES
(July 4, 2013), https://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/05/business/as-competition-wanesamazon-cuts-back-its-discounts.html (explaining that Amazon grew to become “one of the
largest retailers in the country” by reducing or eliminating profit margins, which in turn
drove retail competitors out of business). However, now, Amazon can raise prices because
consumers may not take the time and effort to search for alternatives. Id.
64. See Evgeny Morozov, Tech Titans Are Busy Privatizing Our Data, GUARDIAN (Apr.
24, 2016, 4:00 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2016/apr/24/th
e-new-feudalism-silicon-valley-overlords-advertising-necessary-evil (contending that
tech firms are willing to offer goods and services “at highly subsidised [sic] rates”
because they yield more data).
65. See id. (explaining that it can be difficult for users to understand the true cost
of these subsidized services).
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consumers.66 Because intermediary platform users permit data mining
without compensation, it could be assumed that such content
constitutes a commodity or currency that the data miner can use, while
at the same time claiming that no market-based transaction has
occurred. Arguing that no market exists can bolster assertions that
zero-price transactions have limited, if any, impacts on relevant market
definitions made by antitrust courts.67
Even in the short term, consumers may suffer from the loss of brick and
mortar store competition, as well as from the consequences of more
accurate assessment of consumer price sensitivity and increasingly invasive
collection of subscribers’ consumption behavior and the brokering of
such data by largely unregulated ventures.68 At some point, online
platform operators may consider their market position sufficiently
impenetrable so that they can refrain from aggressive price cutting and
forgoing near term profitability to acquire market share.69

66. Glance, supra note 56 (explaining that, despite user concern for privacy, users
are unwilling to “take actual steps to protect themselves” because “privacy is an abstract
feeling,” people struggle to place an absolute value on it or evaluate how privacy
violations may be harmful); see also Susan Athey et al., The Digital Privacy Paradox: Small
Money, Small Costs, Small Talk 1 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Res., Working Paper No. 23488,
2017), http://papers.nber.org/tmp/99580-w23488.pdf (examining consumer
behavior when faced with “notice and choice” to safeguard their privacy).
67. “With personal data being a potential currency, essentially a non-monetary
price paid . . . and privacy a possible non-price competitive element . . . the question
regarding the relationship between regulation—in this case privacy, consumer and
data protection laws—and competition law has re-emerged . . . .” Just, supra note 15,
at 391 (asserting the need for changes in competition policy to consider how zero
priced transactions affect competition and consumers).
68. Data brokers, or information reselling companies, collect consumer
information and convert it into marketable information about categories of
consumers, or even individual dossiers about a single consumer. See Ashley Kuempel,
Comment, The Invisible Middlemen: A Critique and Call for Reform of the Data Broker
Industry, 36 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 207, 210 (2016) (emphasizing that because
transactions between data brokers and marketing companies occur without
consumers’ knowledge or consent, the public is unaware of their impact on daily life,
let alone their existence).
69. Earlier this year, Amazon increased the price of its most important service, Prime
membership, by twenty percent, from $99 to $119. Nick Wingfield, Amazon’s Profit Swells
to $1.6 Billion, Lifted by Its Cloud Business, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 26, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/26/technology/amazon-prime-profit.html (contrasting
this change with the company’s assertions of providing low prices); see also Streitfeld,
supra note 63.
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Dynamic Pricing Reduces Consumer Surplus

Platform operators and upstream vendors can develop sophisticated
data analytics to help accurately set and frequently modify prices for
commercial transactions.70 Bear in mind that while some platform
operators, such as Facebook and Twitter, rely almost solely on
upstream advertiser payments,71 other intermediaries combine that
revenue stream with downstream sales of goods and services, e.g.,
Amazon, Airbnb, Didi Chuxing, and Uber.72
Dynamic pricing refers to the ability of product and service vendors
to calibrate prices more frequently and accurately.73 Such calibration
can help vendors eliminate or reduce what economists term consumer
surplus: the opportunity to acquire a good or service at a price below
what a consumer would willingly pay.74 Digital intermediaries can
70. See, e.g., Laura Fleming, How Much Does J. Crew Really Know About You?: The
Harsh Reality of a Mega-Retailer’s Privacy Policy, 31 SYRACUSE J. SCI. & TECH. L. 1, 18–20
(2015) (explaining how retailers use customers’ browser history to determine what
products they searched for, bought, and even how much they paid).
71. See Rakesh Sharma, How Facebook Makes Money, INVESTOPEDIA,
https://www.investopedia.com/ask/answers/120114/how-does-facebook-fb-makemoney.asp (last updated Dec. 19, 2018) (noting that more than ninety-nine percent
of Facebook’s total 2017 revenue of $40 billion came from digital advertisements).
72. See Jeff Desjardins, Breaking down How Amazon Makes Money, VISUAL CAPITALIST
(Dec. 19, 2017, 1:32 PM), http://www.visualcapitalist.com/breaking-amazon-makesmoney (providing a breakdown of Amazon’s 2016 revenue).
73. Humans were responsible for determining prices by monitoring market
activity and either raising or lowering prices accordingly. Now, computers have taken
on this role and are able to determine prices within seconds. However, computers can
still make mistakes. For example, Amazon’s price algorithm caused an unintended
price hike in Peter Lawrence’s book, The Making of a Fly. Its highest price was listed as
$23,698,655.93 (plus $3.99 shipping). See Ariel Ezrachi & Maurice E. Stucke, Artificial
Intelligence & Collusion: When Computers Inhibit Competition, 2017 U. ILL. L. REV. 1775,
1780–81 (2017); see also Salil K. Mehra, Antitrust and the Robo-Seller: Competition in the
Time of Algorithms, 100 MINN. L. REV. 1323, 1323–24 (2016) (using Uber’s “surge
pricing” as an example of dynamic pricing).
74. “Those who are able to purchase tickets from the box office and pay only face
value receive a ‘consumer surplus,’ which is the positive difference between what they
would have paid for the ticket and the price they actually paid.” Avi Loewenstein,
Note, Ticket Sniping, 8 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 243, 249 (2010). “By
discriminating on price in such a way that reflects granular knowledge of individual
users’ reservation values, a firm gains the capacity to capture all available consumer
surplus for itself.” Bamberger & Lobel, supra note 1, at 1080–81. “First, for any given
price increase, the loss in consumer surplus exceeds the loss in total surplus because
the latter subtracts the additional profits accruing to sellers. Second, even fairly small
price elevations are a significant concern if only consumer surplus counts.” Louis
Kaplow, An Economic Approach to Price Fixing, 77 ANTITRUST L.J. 343, 354 (2011); see also
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acquire and analyze data about current consumer demand and
available supply of products and services—e.g., the number of available
Uber drivers in a specific locality.75 Rather than set a fixed price, only
occasionally raised or lowered, vendors can make frequent pricing
changes based on current marketplace conditions calculated by
proprietary software that processes freely acquired user data collected by
the intermediary platform operator and forwarded to upstream vendors.76
Arguably, dynamic pricing promotes overall marketplace efficiency
by injecting more frequently and timely fine-tuning of prices based on
changes in supply and demand.77 However, consumers may consider
it unfair and discriminatory, particularly when so-called surge pricing
unexpectedly raises out of pocket costs significantly.78 As demand
increases, or supply drops, prices quickly rise above a level most
consumers consider fair and reasonable.79 Even though low demand

Akiva A. Miller, What Do We Worry About when We Worry about Price Discrimination? The
Law and Ethics of Using Personal Information for Pricing, 19 J. TECH. L. & POL’Y 41, 56
(2014) (explaining that sellers can collect data about a consumer to achieve
“differentiation” or what the seller must know to determine what price to offer, such
as willingness to pay).
75. This data is referred to as “electronic footprints,” which can consist of
consumers’ previous purchases, addresses, or even other websites they have visited.
From this data, vendors can adjust prices based on what a particular consumer is
willing to pay. See Vivian Adame, Comment, Consumers’ Obsession Becoming Retailers’
Possession: The Way that Retailers Are Benefiting from Consumers’ Presence on Social Media,
53 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 653, 667 (2016) (citing Paul Krugman, Reckonings; What Price
Fairness?, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 4, 2000), http://www.nytimes.com/2000/10/04/
opinion/reckonings-what-price-fairness.html).
76. See Ezrachi & Stucke, supra note 73, at 1780 (explaining that online platforms
can adjust prices within milliseconds using dynamic pricing and algorithms, which
optimize a good’s price based on available stock and anticipated demand).
77. For example, if the electric industry used dynamic pricing, ideally “temporary
price spikes would induce immediate demand reductions, and ultimately, lower prices,”
whereas “sustained high prices would provide a sufficient reward for investment in
adequate generation resources, ensuring reliability.” See Emily Hammond & David B.
Spence, The Regulatory Contract in the Marketplace, 69 VAND. L. REV. 141, 170 (2016).
78. Ryan Calo, Digital Market Manipulation, 82 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 995, 1029 (2014)
(noting that digital market manipulation “creates subjective privacy harms” because
consumers do not know whether they are being charged the same price as someone
else or even if “using a different browser or purchasing the item on a different day”
would have saved them money).
79. Dynamic pricing is also coupled with behavioral psychology. For example, a
real-time gasoline pricing tool in Holland had not lowered a station’s prices in
response to a sale at the station across the street. Instead, the program “determined
that long waiting times at the bargain-priced station would discourage buyers,”
accurately predicting that many buyers would utilize the station “across the street

2019]

TWO-SIDED INTERNET MARKETS

729

and oversupply might trigger short term price reductions, consumers
may focus on rapid and substantial surge prices.80
Critics of a platform-dominated economy emphasize harm to both
consumers and workers:
A “peer economy” of platform-arranged production will break down
old hierarchies. Gig workers will be able to knit Etsy scarves in the
morning, drive Uber cars in the afternoon, and write Facebook
comments at night, flexibly shifting between jobs and leisure at will.
But is platform capitalism really a route to opportunity for labor, or
just one more play for capital accumulation in an increasingly
stratified economy?81

The costs and risks borne by non-employee contractors surely
challenge the view that they can combine flexible schedules and
independence with certain and generous hourly earnings.
B.

Lack of Transparency

Far too many platform operators rely on lengthy and obtuse
subscription agreements to set out the terms and conditions for their
acquisition, analysis, use, and sale of consumer data.82 These nonnegotiable contracts of adhesion create enforceable rights for platform
intermediaries, but few responsibilities and curbs on their data mining
and sale.83 Worse yet, some major broadband platform intermediaries
have allowed data acquisition and mining opportunities, directly or
through third parties, far exceeding the ample options they have
reserved.84 To make matters worse, some platform operators do not
where they would be willing to pay more.” See Gregory P. Nowell, Markets, Elites, and
Information Technology in the Internet Age, 53 TULSA L. REV. 335, 340 (2018).
80. On occasion, product offers via intermediaries may reach outrageous multiples
over bricks and mortar pricing. See, e.g., David Streitfeld, Amazon’s Curious Case of the
$2,630.52 Used Paperback, N.Y. TIMES (July 15, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/
07/15/technology/amazon-used-paperback-book-pricing.html.
81. Frank Pasquale, Two Narratives of Platform Capitalism, 35 YALE L. & POL’Y REV.
309, 312–13 (2016) [hereinafter Pasquale, Two Narratives].
82. See Omer Tene & Jules Polonetsky, Big Data for All: Privacy and User Control in
the Age of Analytics, 11 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 239, 260–61 (2013) (arguing that
an emphasis on “consent” in privacy law imposes unrealistic obligations on individuals
to read and understand complex agreements).
83. See id. at 268 (explaining that consumers rarely opt in or opt out of these agreements).
84. For an example of this practice, see Matthew Rosenberg et al., How Trump
Consultants Exploited the Facebook Data of Millions, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 17, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/17/us/politics/cambridge-analytica-trump-campaig
n.html, which discusses how the voter-profiling company Cambridge Analytica harvested
private information of over fifty million Facebook users without their permission.
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disclose data security breaches in a timely manner,85 or admit to
instances where they have intentionally or inadvertently caused such
privacy invasions to occur.86
Platform intermediaries risk losing subscribers’ trust,87 particularly
when failing to disclose data breaches, and instances where third
parties accessed and “mined” consumer data well beyond the scope of
permitted uses.88 When confronted with press accounts of data
breaches or exceeding permissible data mining opportunities, some
platform operators offer incomprehensible excuses, refuse to accept
responsibility, or claim the breach or excessive use of subscriber data
did no harm to subscriber privacy.89
For example, the New York Times reported that Facebook provided
wireless smartphone manufacturers with access to subscriber data,
including immediate location, without subscriber consent.90 Rather

85. For example, Yahoo announced that hackers had stolen at least 500 million
users’ account information two years after the breach occurred. See Nicole Perlroth,
Yahoo Says Hackers Stole Data on 500 Million Users in 2014, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 22, 2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/23/technology/yahoo-hackers.html.
86. Kevin Roose, How Facebook’s Data Sharing Went from Feature to Bug, N.Y. TIMES
(Mar. 19, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/19/technology/facebook-datasharing.html (arguing that Facebook’s broad data collection practices may
compromise the data of its over 2.2 billion registered users); see also Natasha Singer,
What You Don’t Know About How Facebook Uses Your Data, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 11, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/11/technology/facebook-privacy-hearings.html.
87. See Lee Rainie, Americans’ Complicated Feelings About Social Media in an Era of
Privacy Concerns, PEW RES. CTR. (Mar. 27, 2018), http://www.pewresearch.org/facttank/2018/03/27/americans-complicated-feelings-about-social-media-in-an-era-ofprivacy-concerns (arguing that the rapid growth of online platforms has triggered
rising user concerns about privacy). A 2014 survey found that ninety-one percent of
Americans agree that users do not have control over how their information is collected
and used; furthermore, two-thirds of Americans have endorsed the statement that
“current laws are not good enough in protecting people’s privacy, and [sixty-four
percent] support more regulation of advertisers.” See id.
88. See infra notes 89–93 and accompanying text.
89. See, e.g., Sarah Frier, Facebook on Defensive as Cambridge Case Exposes Data Flaw,
BLOOMBERG (Mar. 17, 2018, 6:11 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/
articles/2018-03-17/no-breach-but-not-secure-cambridge-misuse-shows-facebook-flaws
(reporting that Facebook executives initially dismissed Cambridge Analytica’s abuse of
Facebook compiled data and even denied that the abuse was a data breach).
90. Gabriel J.X. Dance et al., Facebook Gave Device Makers Deep Access to Data on Users
and Friends, N.Y. TIMES (June 3, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive
/2018/06/03/technology/facebook-device-partners-users-friends-data.html; see also
Jennifer Valentino-DeVries & Natasha Singer, Los Angeles Accuses Weather Channel App
of Covertly Mining User Data, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 3, 2019), https://www.nytimes.
com/2019/01/03/technology/weather-channel-app-lawsuit.html.
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than admit to this breach of trust and violation of the non-negotiable
subscription agreement it wrote and required customers to accept,
Facebook representatives claimed, with no proof, that consumers
suffered no harm.91
According to Facebook, the wireless
manufacturers left such valuable consumer data inside handset
memory storage so that it could only enhance the Facebook
experience without any other sort of commercial exploitation by third
parties.92 This response appears to create the impression that the
handset manufacturers, which surely paid for the consumer data access
opportunity, made no apparent use of the data other than to offer more
convenient mobile access to Facebook service features. Apparently, this
enhancement offsets any potential for consumer privacy invasion,
intentional violation of contractual curbs, and national security threats
when offering access to Chinese handset manufacturers accused of
supporting espionage endeavors of their government.93
C.

Free Does Not Mean at No Cost

Internet users may have only vague notions that access to free
services comes at some cost. Words like data mining and Big Data94
have entered the vernacular so by now consumers should have some
sense that the operators of platform services have devised ways to

91. See id. (explaining that Facebook officials defended their data sharing practices
as being compliant with its privacy policies, FTC regulations, and contracts that strictly
limit the use of collected data).
92. See id. (quoting a Facebook vice president, Ime Archibong, who claimed that
“device partners can use Facebook data only to provide versions of ‘the Facebook
experience’”); see also Gabriel J.X. Dance et al., Facebook’s Device Partnerships Explained,
N.Y. TIMES (June 4, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/04/technol
ogy/facebook-device-partnerships.html.
93. Michael LaForgia & Gabriel J.X. Dance, Facebook Gave Data Access to Chinese Firm
Flagged by U.S. Intelligence, N.Y. TIMES (June 5, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/
06/05/technology/facebook-device-partnerships-china.html.
94. See Neil M. Richards, The Dangers of Surveillance, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1934, 1939
(2013); see also VIKTOR MAYER-SCHÖNBERGER & KENNETH CUKIER, BIG DATA: A
REVOLUTION THAT WILL TRANSFORM HOW WE LIVE, WORK, AND THINK 6–7 (2013)
(arguing that the explosion of Big Data in the 2000s is only the start of this new era of
information); Danah Boyd & Kate Crawford, Critical Questions for Big Data, 15 INFO.,
COMM. & SOC’Y 662, 664–65 (2012) (analyzing “Big Data” in the social media context);
Tene & Polonetsky, supra note 82, at 240 (explaining that the Big Data explosion is
driven by “reduced costs of storing information” and the “increased capacity to
instantly analyze” large quantities of data). See generally Barocas & Selbst, supra note
13, at 675, 677 (arguing that data mining results in discrimination).
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recoup costs and generate ample profits.95 On its face, better and more
accurately targeted commercials, thoughtful music and video
recommendations, and reports on what products and services other
buyers have combined can provide consumers with helpful data
analytics.96 Consumers still can free-ride subsidized services by not
following through with initial and supplemental purchases as
suggested by platform software.97
On the other hand, most consumers seem uncertain about the
marketplace value of their data, even though many intermediaries
have business plans that derive most revenues from frequent auctions
for highly calibrated advertising placements.98 Advertisers underwrite
consumer access to content and services through paid placements99 on
all the display screens currently in use (televisions, computers,
smartphones, tablets, and wearables, such as watches). These microtransactions add up, particularly for ventures such as Facebook100 and
Google101 that have a global subscriber base making frequent service
requests almost every day.

95. See Boyd & Crawford, supra note 94, at 663–64 (describing “Big Data” as “a cultural,
technological, and scholarly phenomenon” and the rhetoric surrounding the concept).
96. See Natasha Singer, Your Online Attention, Bought in an Instant, N.Y. TIMES (Nov.
17, 2012), https://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/18/technology/your-online-attentionbought-in-an-instant-by-advertisers.html (explaining how data mining determines the
ads that an internet user views).
97. See Richard A. Posner, The Chicago School of Antitrust Analysis, 127 U. PA. L. REV.
925, 926–27 (1979) (explaining the “free-rider” problem).
98. See Singer, supra note 96 (explaining that, within milliseconds, algorithms
collect users’ browsing history and auction this information to marketers, so that they
can show users ads that are tailored specifically to them).
99. See Cade Metz, How Facebook’s Ad System Works, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 12, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/12/technology/how-facebook-ads-work.html;
Jack Nicas, How Google’s Ad Auctions Work, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 19, 2017, 7:00 AM),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/how-googles-ad-auctions-work-1484827203.
100. During the first quarter of 2018, Facebook generated $5.449 billion with an
operating margin of forty-six percent. See Facebook Reports First Quarter 2018 Results,
FACEBOOK (Apr. 25, 2018), https://investor.fb.com/investor-news/press-releasedetails/2018/Facebook-Reports-First-Quarter-2018-Results. In 2017, the company
generated $3.327 with a forty-one percent operating margin. See Maddy Osman, 28
Powerful Facebook Stats Your Brand Can’t Ignore in 2018, SPROUT SOC. (Feb. 15, 2018),
https://sproutsocial.com/insights/facebook-stats-for-marketers/#general.
101. For the first three months ending in March 31, 2018, Google generated $31.16
billion, compared to $30.36 billion in the previous year, a twenty-six percent year-overyear increase. Matthew Lynley, Google Beats Expectations Again with $31.15B in Revenue,
TECHCRUNCH, https://techcrunch.com/2018/04/23/google-beats-expectations-againwith-31-15b-in-revenue (last visited Feb. 5, 2019).
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Few would criticize Google and other ventures for failing to offer
something of significant value or for having exceeded the boundary
lines of capitalism and entrepreneurship. However, consumers
increasingly may have begun to realize that “free access” to platforms
comes at a significant cost. Economists remind us that there “is no free
lunch”102 in commercial transactions and neither is there truly free
access to internet-mediated content and services.103 Rather than
require payment in currency, platform operators extract value from
the consumer data they mine, process, collate, curate, analyze, and
sell.104 In effect, subscribers are both consumers of service provided by
the intermediary, as well as the product of what the platform operator
offers advertisers in exchange for monetary compensation.105
IV. REASONS FOR EMPHASIS ON DOWNSTREAM IMPACTS
Government agencies have several rationales supporting their
emphasis on downstream impacts of intermediary activities. The
agencies can reasonably conclude that the most significant impact on
consumers will occur in their direct interaction with the intermediary,
perhaps discounting the significance of less direct interaction with
upstream ventures whose access to consumers is specified in separate
commercial agreements with the platform operator.106
Privity of contract exists only between the intermediary and downstream
consumers who may not even know with what ventures the intermediary
also has established commercial relationships for sharing and deriving
value from consumer data.107 Indeed, the use of nondisclosure agreements

102. Daniel J. Croxall, Cheers to Central Hudson: How Traditional Intermediate
Scrutiny Helps Keep Independent Craft Beer Viable, 113 NW. U. L. REV. ONLINE 1, 6 (2018)
(“[T]he phrase ‘there is no free lunch’ is often credited to pre-Prohibition U.S.
saloons. Tied-houses would offer thirsty lunch crowds a ‘free lunch’ if they purchased
beer or other alcoholic beverages during the lunch session.”).
103. See Morozov, supra note 64 (explaining platforms are willing to offer services
“at highly subsidised [sic] rates” because data is the source of their profits).
104. See Just, supra note 15, at 391 (arguing that personal data is a potential currency
because internet platforms collect data to “extract economic value from it”).
105. Scott Goodson, If You’re Not Paying for It, You Become the Product, FORBES (Mar.
5, 2012, 12:34 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/marketshare/2012/03/05/ifyoure-not-paying-for-it-you-become-the-product.
106. See Tene & Polonetsky, supra note 82, at 259 (discussing an FTC report that
considers downstream contractual obligations).
107. See id. at 261 (noting that data flows against a “complex backdrop . . . involving
dense networks of platforms and applications, including contractors, subcontractors,
and service providers”).
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between intermediaries and upstream ventures prevent government
agencies and consumers from having a true sense of the potential for harm
resulting from the widespread transactions that extract monetary value in
consumer data acquisition, analytics, and sale.108
While the upstream contracts may have substantial impact on
consumers, government agencies understandably concentrate on
short term, direct impacts, because existing policies emphasize an
assessment whether market efficiency gains can be identified.109 If such
benefits appear, then the agencies can eschew further scrutiny, even if
an arguably more extensive review would identify offsetting declines in
consumer welfare.110 Ventures can exploit privacy intrusions and data
mining opportunities in the upstream side of an internet intermediary.
This exploitation harms both consumers and competitors in core and
adjacent markets.111 In this obscured and largely ignored space, much
mischief and harm can occur, as evidenced by interference with the
2016 United States presidential election112 and the referendum on
whether the United Kingdom should leave the European Union.113
108. “Businesses like Facebook hold crucial information about people’s social and
political behavior. But they are extremely reluctant to provide that data to outsiders,
unless those outsiders sign nondisclosure agreements (NDAs) that give Facebook the
power to sue if the information is used in ways that the company finds objectionable.”
Henry Farrell, How Facebook Stymies Social Science, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (Dec. 19,
2017), https://www.chronicle.com/article/How-Facebook-Stymies-Social/242090.
109. See Posner, supra note 97, at 928 (arguing that antitrust laws should not only
focus on “unilateral action”); see also Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Policy After Chicago,
84 MICH. L. REV. 213, 215 (1985) (“The Chicago School model of antitrust policy
dictates that allocative efficiency as defined by the market should be the only goal of
the antitrust laws.”). Chicago School antitrust policy interprets federal antitrust laws
as emphasizing the duty to maximize economic efficiency and consumer welfare with
less emphasis on the extent of current and future competition. Id. at 226.
110. See id. at 225 (explaining that scale economies pose difficulties for enforcement
agencies and courts to determine whether a particular practice is competitive).
111. See Rory Van Loo, Rise of the Digital Regulator, 66 DUKE L.J. 1267, 1271–72, 1271
n.23, 1287 (2017) (explaining the threat digital intermediaries pose when gathering
information, including privacy violations, guiding consumers toward harm, and
blocking competitors).
112. For a comprehensive list of new accounts on Russian hacking and interference
with the 2016 U.S. presidential election, see Russian Hacking and Influence in the U.S.
Election, N.Y. TIMES, https://www.nytimes.com/news-event/russian-election-hacking
(last visited Feb. 5, 2019). See, e.g., MINORITY STAFF OF S. COMM. ON FOREIGN RELS.,
115TH CONG., PUTIN’S ASYMMETRIC ASSAULT ON DEMOCRACY IN RUSSIA AND EUROPE:
IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY 153 (Comm. Print 2018).
113. See, e.g., DIGITAL, CULTURE, MEDIA AND SPORT COMMITTEE, DISINFORMATION AND
‘FAKE NEWS’: INTERIM REPORT, 2017–19, HC 363, at 3, 33, 43–44 (UK) (detailing Russian
influence in the UK’s EU referendum); David D. Kirkpatrick, Signs of Russian Meddling
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In addition to focusing on consumers and their opportunities for
short term benefits, such as subsidies and free-rider opportunities,
government agencies face other disincentives to look upstream.
Currently prevailing political and economic policy promote reduced
government oversight.114
Government agencies appreciate the
negative public perception of appearing to expand their regulatory
“wingspan.”115 The agencies risk triggering claims of mission creep by
upstream stakeholders who also may assert that the government
agencies lack jurisdiction to conduct any investigation.116
Allegations of overreach also may include arguments that the
government agencies violate upstream vendors’ First Amendment
speaker rights, particularly for information, communications, and
entertainment ventures offering audio and video content,117 as well as
advertising that qualifies for much of the speech protection accorded
individuals.118 Similarly, government agencies risk triggering claims
that they have impeded the rights of upstream ventures to engage in
interstate commerce with platform operators.119

in Brexit Referendum, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 15, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11
/15/world/europe/russia-brexit-twitter-facebook.html (identifying Russian use of
Twitter in relation to the UK’s EU referendum).
114. See Rob Frieden, Assessing the Merits of Network Neutrality Obligations at Low, Medium
and High Network Layers, 115 PENN. ST. L. REV. 49, 52 (2010) (“Ample case law supports
the premise that the FCC has no basis to impede and regulate Internet-mediated content
and services.”); Muris, supra note 25, at 516 (“Crucially, the enormous benefits of
payment cards have developed through market competition, largely free from
micromanagement by government regulators.”); Van Loo, supra note 111, at 1271–72
(describing how regulations targeting digital intermediaries have failed).
115. See generally Frieden, supra note 114, at 51–52, 54, 61, 64 (citing examples of
government agencies, such as the FCC, trying to stretch their regulatory wingspan).
116. See Paul Ohm & Blake Reid, Regulating Software when Everything Has Software, 84
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1672, 1699 (2016) (examining the importance of clear
authorization in order to counteract uncertainty in the context of agency regulation
of software); see also Van Loo, supra note 111, at 1314 (explaining that although the
FTC and CFPB have claimed authority over intermediaries’ practices, there are no
rules regulating digital intermediaries).
117. For example, in his dissent to an en banc decision to deny a rehearing and thus
uphold the lawfulness of regulation by the FCC, Judge Brett Kavanaugh (now Justice of
the Supreme Court) asserted that the net neutrality rule violates the First Amendment
rights of internet service providers unless the FCC shows the provider possesses relevant
market power. U.S. Telecom Ass’n v. FCC, 855 F.3d 381, 426, 435 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (en
banc) (per curiam) (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 475 (2017).
118. See id. at 429 n.8 (majority opinion), 435 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting).
119. See id. at 427 (explaining that Congress’s constitutional power over interstate
commerce is limited by communication entities’ First Amendment rights).
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The reluctance to probe upstream activities may also stem from the
increasingly questionable conclusion that upstream vendors do not
operate in ways that might harm consumers. Belatedly, we have seen
data mining generating significant and unexpected adverse
consequences; including, direct impacts on presidential elections,
manipulating public opinion through fake news,120 and acquiring data
about consumers who have not consented to any sort of mining and
may not even know their data has been extracted, analyzed, and sold.121
Additionally, regulatory agencies may have concluded that previous
enforcement actions and consent decrees provide sufficient
safeguards.122 Such confidence appears misinformed or misguided in
light of recent news accounts reporting on the lack of transparency
and possible violations of existing Federal Trade Commission (FTC)
consent decrees by Facebook, Google, and other intermediaries.123
Government agencies—with clear jurisdiction to assess the potential
for harm to consumers and competition—continue to use evaluative
tools primarily created for and applied to bricks and mortar
transactions.124 While governments have applied these tools to
information-age transactions—e.g., credit cards—until quite recently,
the analysis largely has ignored the two-sided market structure and
failed to appreciate that this industrial structure has significant

120. See Lili Levi, Real “Fake News” and Fake “Fake News,” 16 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 232,
239 (2017) (describing how social media and news intermediaries use algorithms to
address the problem of “fake news” circulation).
121. See John D. McKinnon, FTC Probing Facebook over Data Use by Cambridge Analytica,
WALL STREET J., (Mar. 20, 2018, 6:35 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/ftc-probingfacebook-over-data-use-by-cambridge-analytica-1521561803 (describing a consent
decree, which requires user consent to gather personal data).
122. See Facebook Settles FTC Charges that It Deceived Consumers by Failing to Keep Privacy
Promises, FED. TRADE COMM’N (Nov. 29, 2011), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/pressreleases/2011/11/facebook-settles-ftc-charges-it-deceived-consumers-failing-keep
(detailing that Facebook’s settlement of a privacy dispute includes provisions for
future compliance and noting that consent decrees are binding). But see McKinnon,
supra note 121 (suggesting companies may violate consent decrees).
123. See FTC Accepts Final Settlement with Twitter for Failure to Safeguard Personal
Information, FED. TRADE COMM’N (Mar. 11, 2011), https://www.ftc.gov/newsevents/press-releases/2011/03/ftc-accepts-final-settlement-twitter-failure-safeguardpersonal; FTC Gives Final Approval to Settlement with Google over Buzz Rollout, FED. TRADE
COMM’N (Oct. 24, 2011), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2011/10/
ftc-gives-final-approval-settlement-google-over-buzz-rollout.
124. See Michael Katz & Jonathan Sallet, Multisided Platforms and Antitrust
Enforcement, 127 YALE L.J. 2142, 2169 (2018) (noting that existing antitrust evaluation
mechanisms can be used to evaluate multisided platforms).
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potential for both benefitting and harming consumers.125 With an
emphasis on current market definition and share, government
agencies may fail to see interaction between intermediaries and
upstream ventures that have direct and indirect impacts on
downstream consumers.126 By emphasizing what can be identified and
measured easily, government agencies fail to see more obscure
offsetting costs and harms.127
V. OHIO V. AMERICAN EXPRESS CO. AND A
NEW FOCUS ON BOTH MARKET SIDES
A recent Supreme Court decision involving a credit card issuer
provides insight on current disputes about the proper scope of market
definition and analysis of platform intermediaries. Ohio v. American
Express Co.128 addresses how courts should define the relevant market129
to prevent finding anticompetitive harms where little or none exist—a
false positive—and perhaps also to avoid decision making that ignores
consumer harms—a false negative.130
In American Express Co., the conservative majority of the Court,
endorsing recent economic doctrine championed by academics,131
upheld a decision by the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit to reject a district court’s relevant market determination in an
antitrust review of an alleged vertical restraint of trade.132 The
125. Muris, supra note 25, at 530–31, 537.
126. See Filistrucchi et al., supra note 9, at 294–95 (emphasizing the importance of defining
the market correctly, but admitting that market definition focuses on only substitutable goods).
127. See Muris, supra note 25, at 537.
128. 138 S. Ct. 2274 (2018).
129. See id. at 2287. Katz & Sallet, supra note 124, at 2144 (explaining that in
platform industries there is debate over how to incorporate relationships between the
two sides of the platform into the market definition). See generally FTC v. Ind. Fed’n of
Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 460 (1986) (“[T]he purpose of the inquiries into market
definition and market power is to determine whether an arrangement has the
potential for genuine adverse effects on competition.”).
130. See Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. at 2287.
131. See id. at 2280–81 (citing EVANS & SCHMALENSEE, MATCHMAKERS, supra note 9,
at 25); David S. Evans & Michael Noel, Defining Antitrust Markets when Firms Operate TwoSided Platforms, 2005 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 667, 668 (2005); David S. Evans & Richard
Schmalensee, Markets with Two-Sided Platforms, 1 ISSUES IN COMPETITION L. & POL’Y 667,
668 (2008); Filistrucchi et al., supra note 9, at 296; Klein et al., supra note 25, at 580,
583; Muris, supra note 25, at 532–33; Jean-Charles Rochet & Jean Tirole, Platform
Competition in Two-Sided Markets, 1 J. EUR. ECON. ASS’N 990, 1013 (2003); see also Brief
for Antitrust Law & Economics Scholars as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents at
1, Ohio v. Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. 2274 (2018).
132. Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. at 2283.
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Supreme Court endorsed the finding that the district court should
have assessed consumer impacts on both sides of the market served by
the credit card issuing company: the downstream users of cards and
the upstream vendors accepting cards for payment.133 The alleged
vertical restraint involved so-called anti-steering contractual language
that prohibited vendors, agreeing to accept American Express credit
cards, from trying to persuade customers to use a different card that
imposed lower “swipe fee”134 processing costs on the vendor.
The district court suggested that relevant market and impact analysis
of anti-steering contractual language required consideration of how
anti-steering provisions affected both merchants and consumers—
ostensibly a complete two-sided market assessment. However, the district
court focused on how the anti-steering contractual language helped
maintain higher swipe fees that harmed both competition among credit
card issuers and consumers with apparently no offsetting benefits.135
This court also determined that American Express had market
power because it imposed twenty fee increases over a five-year period
without losing market share in terms of the number of vendors
accepting its cards and credit card transaction processing.136 The
district court concluded that in the absence of the anti-steering
provisions, swipe fees to merchants and consumer costs would have
been lower.137 The court considered as corroborating evidence the
decision by the Discover credit card company to abandon its business

133. Id. at 2286.
134. Consumers may not know the cost vendors incur when accepting credit cards
in lieu of cash payment. Swipe fees range from one percent to five percent of the
purchase amount. Tim Parker, The Truth About Credit Card Swipe Fees, INVESTOPEDIA
(July 14, 2011, 2:00 AM), https://www.investopedia.com/financial-edge/0711/thetruth-about-credit-card-swipe-fees.aspx.
135. The interrelationship between the two sides of the platform demands that both
sides must be considered. See United States v. Am. Express Co., 88 F. Supp. 3d 143,
156 (E.D.N.Y. 2015). Plaintiffs have the initial burden of proof to show that the
defendants have adversely affected the market. The plaintiffs successfully met this
burden and proved American Express capable of affecting the market. Id. at 187.
American Express argued that it must charge a premium to be successful. Id. at 199.
Non-discrimination provisions take power away from merchants and reduce the
incentives of credit card companies to lower rates. The court found that the NonDiscrimination Provisions have been detrimental to competition. Id. at 207–08.
136. Id. at 188 (finding that American Express possesses market power due to its
“significant market share in a highly concentrated market with high barriers to entry”
and the ability to increase swipe fees frequently without losing market share).
137. Id. at 208 (finding that the Plaintiffs demonstrated harm in the form of
“inflated merchant discount rates” passed on to customers from “higher retail prices”).
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model of offering comparatively lower fees as an inducement for more
vendors to accept the card for payment and in turn to acquire greater
market share of credit card usage.138 As the company having the smallest
market share, Discover sought to differentiate its card with merchants;
however, Discover could not acquire more market share because
vendors could not encourage customers to use its credit card.139
Both the Second Circuit Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court
opted to examine market impacts on both sides of the credit card
platform marketplace.140 These appellate courts both concluded that
to assess the complete impact of a credit card company’s anti-steering
contractual language, judges should identify and consider the
consequences of any positive or negative impact.141 The Second
Circuit Court of Appeals found the credit card network participants
(card issuers, banks, and merchants) must consider the
interdependency142 between both merchants and cardholders, because
price changes on one side can result in demand changes on the
other side. If a merchant finds that a network’s fees to accept a
particular card exceed the benefit that the merchant gains by
accepting that card, then the merchant likely will choose not to
accept the card. On the other side, if a cardholder finds that too few
merchants accept a particular card, then the cardholder likely will
not want to use that card in the first place. Accordingly, in order to
succeed, a credit-card network must “find an effective method for
balancing the prices on the two sides of the market.”143

138. “American Express’s merchant restraints also render it nearly impossible for a
firm to enter the relevant market by offering merchants a low-cost alternative to the
existing networks.” Id. at 213 (citing the failure of Discover’s lower swipe fee model).
139. Id. at 213–14.
140. United States v. Am. Express Co., 838 F.3d 179, 186 (2d Cir. 2016), aff’d, Ohio
v. Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. 2274, 2285–87 (2018).
141. Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. at 2285–87; Am. Express Co., 838 F.3d at 186.
142. Explaining that,
The functions provided by the credit-card industry are highly interdependent
and, at the cardholder/merchant-acceptance level, result in what has been
called a “two-sided market.” The cardholder and the merchant both depend
upon widespread acceptance of a card. That is, cardholders benefit from
holding a card only if that card is accepted by a wide range of merchants, and
merchants benefit from accepting a card only if a sufficient number of
cardholders use it.
Am. Express Co., 838 F.3d at 185–86.
143. Id. at 186 (quoting Jean–Charles Rochet & Jean Tirole, An Economic Analysis of the
Determination of Interchange Fees in Payment Card Systems, 2 REV. NETWORK ECON. 69, 72 (2003)).
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Both appellate courts undertook a comparison of costs and benefits
affecting both vendors and credit card users.144 While anti-steering rules
mandated by credit card issuers can constitute an illegal vertical restraint
on trade by reducing competition among credit card companies, the
courts considered the potential for offsetting positive financial impact
on credit card users through more generous and diversified benefits,
e.g., financial rebates and enhanced travel services.145
Analysis by the Second Circuit Court of Appeals emphasized how
variance in costs incurred by both vendors and credit card users can
impact both sides of the platform operated by a credit card issuer.146
Considering the interdependency of product and service vendors and
consumers using credit cards, the court identified two joint market
effects not considered by the district court: (1) the impact of antisteering rules on the level of card issuer market competition, and, (2)
the impact of credit card issuer anti-steering rules on their incentives
to offer usage inducements to consumers.147 While the credit card
marketplace is concentrated with only four companies and evidences
substantial barriers to market entry, the Second Circuit Court of
Appeals noted the ease with which consumers can shift card allegiance
based on many factors including the costs incurred by using a specific
card and the financial inducements offered by credit card issuers to
encourage consumer loyalty.148
The Supreme Court’s conservative majority affirmed the Second
Circuit Court of Appeals’ analysis and conclusion that the lower court

144. Id. at 185–86.
145. For example,
In order to remain competitive on the cardholder side of the platform, a
payment-card network might need to increase cardholder rewards—or, in
other words, cut prices to cardholders. This, in turn, might diminish the
network’s profitability from the hypothetical price increase. If the network
chose in that situation not to increase cardholder rewards, then merchant
attrition likely would continue increasing as a result of the reduction in
cardholders. Over time, the reduction in transactions could make the
hypothetical price increase unprofitable.
Id. at 202.
146. Id. at 186.
147. Id. at 197, 202.
148. Id. at 189–90 (explaining that “multihoming” creates substitutes, which allows
cardholders and merchants to choose from an array of multiple cards according to
their needs, thus making it harder for credit card companies to unilaterally increase
prices). “A firm that can attract customer loyalty only by reducing its prices does not
have the power to increase prices unilaterally.” Id. at 203.
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should have assessed the consumer impact of transactions occurring
on both sides of the credit card issuer’s platform:
Price increases on one side of the platform likewise do not suggest
anticompetitive effects without some evidence that they have
increased the overall cost of the platform’s services. Thus, courts
must include both sides of the platform—merchants and
cardholders—when defining the credit-card market.149

The Court determined that both sides of an intermediary platform
require examination because two inter-related transactions take place,
each of which affect both upstream and downstream participants.150 By
examining the marketplace impact on both sides of the American
Express platform, the Court identified consumer and competitive
benefits that offset the harm to consumers identified by the district
court.151 Identifying this benefit would not occur if a court examined
impacts on just one side of the intermediary’s transactions when
identifying what constitutes the relevant market for credit card
services.152 Because credit card anti-steering contractual terms might
not constitute an unlawful vertical restraint on trade, the reviewing
court could avoid a false positive finding of anticompetitive harm to
consumers by acquiring a complete evidentiary record, including an
assessment about the potentially favorable impact of the anti-steering
contractual language on both vendors and consumers.153
The dissenting opinion in American Express Co., written by Justice
Breyer and joined by the three other liberal Justices, disputed the
lawfulness of the two-sided market examination.154 Both camps agreed
that an alleged vertical restraint required a “rule of reason” analysis
that has three analytical steps.155 The Court factions disagreed on
whether the first step identification of the relevant market includes
participants on both sides of the intermediary platform.156 If only the
downstream consumer side requires analysis, then the plaintiffs more
readily could identify substantial anticompetitive effects and meet its

149. Ohio v. Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. 2274, 2286 (2018).
150. The link between merchants and cardholders requires equal and balanced
transactions; both sides of the platform must choose the same network for a
transaction to occur. Id. at 2286.
151. Id. at 2287–88.
152. Id. at 2287.
153. See id. at 2284, 2287–88.
154. Id. at 2290 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
155. See id. at 2284 (majority opinion).
156. Id. at 2290–91 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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evidentiary burden, thereby triggering the second step where the
defendant must identify procompetitive rationales for the restraint.157
If successful, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to demonstrate that
the procompetitive efficiencies could be reasonably achieved through
less anticompetitive means.158
The Court majority determined that had the district court assessed
the competitive and consumer impact of the anti-steering rules on
both sides of the market, it would not have concluded that the plaintiffs
had satisfied their initial burden of introducing evidence of substantial
anticompetitive harm.159 A persuasive case for financial harm had been
made with the narrow focus on downstream consumers because higher
swipe fees clearly result in higher merchant costs, at least some of which
will flow through to consumers.160 However, the district court could
have identified offsetting consumer benefits when considering what
“rewards” American Express provides its customers.161
Justice Breyer, in dissent, strongly asserted that the district court had
no reason to expand its market impact analysis, noting that no antitrust
case precedent supports doing so.162 Additionally, he noted case
precedent does not favor judicial netting or balancing of competitive
benefits and harms occurring in different markets.163
The sole focus on the immediate impact of higher swipe fees on
downstream credit card users ignores other factors that might reduce
or eliminate a conclusion of anticompetitive harm, such as higher
prices to consumers.164 A more nuanced, calibrated, and granular
analysis considers the credit card ecosystem as both two-sided and
segmented by card issuer marketing strategies.165 Swipe fee pricing
strategy constitutes a key differentiator for which credit cards a vendor
would accept, but other factors come into play, particularly on the
consumer side.166 Some consumers might want a credit card that offers
157. Id. at 2284.
158. Id. at 2284–85.
159. Id.
160. See United States v. Am. Express Co., 838 F.3d 179, 185, 199 n.45 (2d Cir. 2016).
161. See id. at 185.
162. In his dissent, Justice Breyer criticized the majority’s failure to abide by
precedent or explain why two-sided platforms should merge into one market. Am.
Express Co., 138 S. Ct. at 2302 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
163. For a company that sells complementary products, a court should not assess
the products together, but rather should look only at the product at issue. Id. at 2298.
164. Id. at 2287–88; see also Parker, supra note 134.
165. Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. at 2287–88 (majority opinion).
166. Id. at 2286, 2288–89.
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generous financial rebates and other subsidies, such as airline miles.167
Others might want one that offers a low short-term interest rate on
balance due transfers.168 Others might willingly pay for the privilege
of tapping a benefit-rich inventory, including airline lounge access,
“free” baggage allowances on specific airlines, concierge-provided
travel assistance, and early opportunities to buy Broadway and concert
tickets at face value.169
In this more segmented marketplace, a credit card company might
execute a strategy of demanding comparatively higher swipe fees of
vendors to generate more generous and desirable credit card user
rewards.170 Another company might use lower swipe fees as an
incentive for more vendors to accept purchases using the card.171
Arguably, such differentiation promotes a competitive marketplace
both in terms of what inducements credit card companies must offer
consumers and which card a consumer will use for each transaction.172
The Court majority noted that American Express uses a marketing
strategy geared towards attracting wealthier card users likely to make
more expensive purchases.173 This strategy does not primarily rely on
revenues accruing from interest payments by card users not making
full payment within a short grace period.174 It compensates for
comparatively fewer transactions and monetary loans with higher swipe
fees involving more expensive purchases.175 Two major credit card
issuers, MasterCard and Visa, use a different strategy that is less reliant
on swipe fees than on credit card user interest payments.176
The American Express Co. case emphasizes the need for courts and, by
extension, regulatory agencies, to consider the relationship between
upstream and downstream market participants in terms of their

167. Id. at 2280.
168. Lisa Joyce, What Consumers Love (and Hate) About Debit and Credit Cards, FIN.
BRAND (Sept. 27, 2017), https://thefinancialbrand.com/67725/consumer-bankingdebit-credit-card-preferences (illustrating consumers’ consideration of interest rates as
compared to other credit card features).
169. Id.
170. Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. at 2288.
171. Id. at 2289.
172. Id. at 2289–90.
173. “To encourage cardholder spending, Amex provides better rewards than other
networks. Due to its superior rewards, Amex tends to attract cardholders who are
wealthier and spend more money.” Id. at 2282.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 2292 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
176. Id. at 2282 (majority opinion).
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interdependency and their relationship with the platform
intermediary.177 In the credit card ecosystem, the availability of
alternative credit cards and the ease with which consumers can change
allegiances evidence a competitive credit card platform marketplace
with significant consumer sensitivity to comparative costs and benefits
accruing from the use of specific cards.178 Some credit card users
attempt to maximize downstream subsidies and rebates by acquiring
many different cards from banks offering generous inducements to
apply and strategically using the one card that confers the best benefits
for each transaction, e.g., Card A for gasoline, Card B for airline
tickets, Card C for restaurants.179
The division of the Supreme Court on a liberal versus conservative
fulcrum in this case may identify what constituencies and economic
doctrine each faction favors. The majority persuasively demonstrates
that in the credit card ecosystem, two complementary and inter-related
transactions take place.180 In his dissent, Justice Breyer suggests that
“the complementary relationship between the products is irrelevant to
the purpose of market definition,”181 emphasizing that his
understanding of antitrust law and economics was that market analysis
should be limited to substitutes.182 Justice Breyer objects to the
majority’s decision to determine a net market impact of the antisteering contract provisions by combining the negative impact of
higher merchant swipe fees and the positive impact on consumers able
to tap into more and better credit card services and rewards.183
While not using the same term, the Court majority considers card
user and card accepting vendors as jointly participating in transactions

177. Id. at 2285–87.
178. Id. at 2289–90.
179. Daniel Bortz, How Many Credit Cards Should You Really Have?, FORBES (Sept. 14,
2016, 9:00 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/learnvest/2016/09/14/how-manycredit-cards-should-you-really-have; see also AnnaMaria Andriotis & Emily Glazer,
Rewards Credit Cards Gained a Fanatic Following—Now Banks Are Pulling Back, WALL ST. J.
(Jan. 1, 2019), https://www.wsj.com/articles/rewards-credit-cards-gained-a-fanaticfollowingnow-banks-are-pulling-back-11546365926.
180. Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. at 2280.
181. When defining the relevant product market, economists and courts include all
goods and services that potential purchasers consider close substitutes. Id. at 2298
(Breyer, J., dissenting); see also Katz & Sallet, supra note 124, at 2154 & n.37.
182. “[T]he market . . . does not include what economists call complements: goods
or services that are used together with the restrained product, but that cannot be
substituted for that product.” Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. at 2295 (Breyer. J., dissenting).
183. Id. at 2294–95.
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that affect each other and thereby bind them and their markets
together.184 The majority decision deems this integration as evidence
that “indirect network effects”185 apply to both parties, because “the
value of the two-sided platform to one group of participants depends
on how many members of a different group participate.”186 Arguably,
a relevant market analysis requires impact assessment on both sides of
an intermediary platform because
[r]aising the price on side A risks losing participation on that side,
which decreases the value of the platform to side B. If participants
on side B leave due to this loss in value, then the platform has even
less value to side A—risking a feedback loop of declining demand.187

The majority held that the plaintiffs did not meet their burden of
proving anticompetitive effects in the relevant market, because “the
product that credit-card companies sell is transactions, not services to
merchants.”188 As a result, the majority argues, the plaintiff must show
anticompetitive effects on “the two-sided credit-card market as a
whole” by proving that “Amex’s anti steering provisions increased the
cost of credit-card transactions above a competitive level, reduced the
number of credit-card transactions, or otherwise stifled competition in
the credit-card market.”189
A.

Impact of Ohio v. American Express Co. on Internet Intermediaries

American Express Co. addressed credit card transactions that include
a large percentage occurring in traditional bricks and mortar
locations.190 The case considered the potential for false positive findings
of anticompetitive harm should a reviewing court limit its examination
to the downstream impact on consumers.191 In light of the speedy

184. “[W]henever a credit-card network sells one transaction’s worth of cardacceptance services to a merchant it also must sell one transaction’s worth of cardpayment services to a cardholder. It cannot sell transaction services to either
cardholders or merchants individually.” Id. at 2286 (majority opinion).
185. Id. at 2277. “[T]he benefits of indirect network effects can only be achieved
when multiple agents are coordinated, and participation of each agent is ensured. . . .
Without a multi-sided platform, the ‘value-creating’ interaction among multiple
agencies could be extremely costly.” D. Daniel Sokol & Jingyuan (Mary) Ma, Understanding
Online Markets and Antitrust Analysis, 15 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 43, 51–52 (2017).
186. Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. at 2280.
187. Id. at 2281.
188. Id. at 2287.
189. Id.
190. Id. at 2282.
191. Id. at 2287.
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growth in electronic commerce transactions, we should consider the
impact of American Express Co. on the two-sided market platforms that
operate via the internet. Many of these transactions have the potential
to trigger a false negative finding of no consumer harms if reviewing
courts and regulatory agencies solely examine the downstream impact
and ignore offsetting harms generated by upstream transactions
between the intermediary platform operators and third parties running
the gamut from data brokers and advertisers to foreign governments
seeking to meddle in elections and fake news disseminators.192
The Court noted that its decision did not endorse universal
assessment of both sides of a two-sided market.193 However, the case
offers a strong precedent for doing so to avoid making an incomplete
or wrong marketplace assessment.194 Arguably, the case provides a
rationale for two-sided market examinations when the risk of either a
false positive or a false negative exists.195 This motivation to conduct a
macro-level analysis stems from the likely consequences that limiting
analysis to one side of the market, while consistent with traditional
relevant market definition,196 misses significant direct, secondary and
even tertiary impacts.
Justice Breyer’s dissent and the friend of court filings by antitrust law
and economics scholars make a persuasive argument that the longstanding rule of reason analysis of vertical restraints, such as the antisteering provisions, contemplates a properly calibrated relevant
market definition.197 Expanding the relevant market to include
192. See Editorial Board, After Russia’s Election Interference, Pulling Back the Curtain on
Online Ads, WASH. POST (Nov. 23, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.
com/opinions/whos-paying-for-online-ads/2017/11/23/493cc11c-ce44-11e7-9d3abcbe2af58c3a_story.html; David Lazarus, Who Oversees Data Brokers Selling Your Personal
Information? No One, L.A. TIMES (Oct. 28, 2016, 3:00 AM), http://www.latimes
.com/business/lazarus/la-fi-lazarus-list-brokers-20161028-snap-story.html.
193. Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. at 2286. For example, in Times-Picayune Publishing Co.
v. United States, 345 U.S. 594 (1953), the Court used a one-sided, upstream assessment on
advertisers in New Orleans subject to a requirement by the dominant newspaper that they
pay for advertisements in both morning and evening editions. Id. at 610. The Court held
that the requirement did not constitute a violation of the Sherman Act. Id.
194. Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. at 2286.
195. Id. at 2285–87.
196. “[D]efining the relevant market to include all sides of the platform creates a
broader space of allowable trade-offs than when the definition” encompasses just one
side. See Patrick R. Ward, Testing for Multisided Platform Effects in Antitrust Market
Definition, 84 U. CHI. L. REV. 2059, 2060 (2017).
197. See Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. at 2296-97 (Breyer, J., dissenting); Brief for Amici
Curiae John M. Connor et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 30, Ohio v. Am.
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offsetting harm does come across as a netting or cost/benefit analysis
in contrast to the conventional process where a court only looks for a
market of substitutes and assesses the potential for harm directly to
these competitors.198 The Supreme Court has endorsed a market
definition that considers instances where Peter gets robbed—reduced
competition among credit card companies—but Paul gets paid—
consumers benefit from enhanced and more valuable credit card
services.199 Without examining both sides of a platform intermediary
market, courts would miss both substantial offsetting activities that can
contribute benefits (or costs) directly to participants on each side, and
even to non-participants.200
In a broader context, without examining both sides of the platform,
courts would not see favorable or harmful impacts that could reduce the
likelihood of the court making a false positive or false negative
determination of consumer harm. Secondary impacts for internet
platforms include the potential for disrupting business models used by
brick and mortar vendors of products and services.201 Tertiary impacts
include how internet platforms affect and change labor relations, civil
society, elections, what constitutes a reasonable expectation of privacy, and
the potential for loss of trust in a variety of public and private transactions.202
If antitrust courts interpret their statutory mission to examine how
vertical restraints affect consumers, then the analysis arguably should
include a relevant market definition and thorough examination
including the positive and negative impact that the platform model has
on consumers. For internet platforms, this process may become
Express Co., 138 S. Ct. 2274 (2018); Brief of 28 Professors of Antitrust Law as Amici
Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 16–19, Ohio v. Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. 2274 (2018).
198. Katz & Sallet, supra note 124, at 2162 (noting that certain platform conduct
can benefit one group of users whole harming another, creating the choice of whether
and how to balance gains experienced by one group against losses suffered by another
group as a result of anti-competitive conduct).
199. Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. at 2286–87.
200. “[D]efining the relevant market to include all sides of the platform . . . provides
the opportunity to trade procompetitive effects on one side of the platform for
anticompetitive effects on the other side.” Ward, supra note 196, at 2077–78.
201. See Wolf Richter, Here’s Which Brick-and-Mortar Retailers are Getting Hit the Hardest,
BUS. INSIDER (May 19, 2018, 11:02 AM), https://www.businessinsider.com/brick-andmortar-retailers-getting-hit-the-hardest-2018-5.
202. See Molly Wood, Facebook Generation Rekindles Expectation of Privacy Online, N.Y.
TIMES (Sept. 7, 2017, 7:00 AM), https://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/09/07/
rethinking-privacy-on-the-internet; Janna Anderson & Lee Rainie, The Future of Truth
and Misinformation Online, PEW RES. CTR. (Oct. 19, 2017), http://www.pewinternet.org
/2017/10/19/the-future-of-truth-and-misinformation-online.
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increasingly difficult as both positive and negative impacts may be
difficult to quantify.203 However, the difficulty and potential for
imperfect calculations should not foreclose the analysis. In the
American Express Co. case, the offsetting benefits from enhanced card
user services were recognized, but not specifically quantified by the
reviewing courts.204 Nevertheless, the Supreme Court majority was
confident that the enhancements to the welfare of a specific card-using
group of consumers offset the costs to all vendors accepting credit
cards and arguably all consumers likely to incur higher prices because
of increased swipe fees.205
VI. IDENTIFYING ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS IN THE
NECESSARY UPSTREAM ANALYSIS
The American Express Co. case highlights the importance of relevant
market assessment as well as consideration whether consumers have
competitive and functionally equivalent options.206 While the dissent
expressed concern that the majority opted to consider both sides of
the credit issuer’s platform, it emphasized how doing so resulted in a
finding that the plaintiff had failed to meet its evidentiary production
burden in the first of three steps in a rule of reason analysis regarding
an alleged vertical restraint of trade.207 Such a determination
terminates the case, because the second step in a rule of reason analysis
occurs only if plaintiffs meet their burden in the first step.208
Had the case proceeded to the second step, the defendants would
have had the opportunity to introduce evidence including how credit
card accepting vendors’ payments to American Express generated
consumer benefits.209 The defendants also could demonstrate that
even in a concentrated market of four major credit card suppliers,
consumers can regularly switch and thereby face no lock-in, unlike
many internet markets dominated by a single venture.210 This
evidentiary production would have introduced upstream market
transactions into the record, so arguably no justice objected to such an
203. Ryan Calo & Alex Rosenblat, The Taking Economy: Uber, Information, and Power,
117 COLUM. L. REV. 1623, 1649–50 (2017).
204. Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. at 2282, 2288.
205. Id. at 2282, 2288–89.
206. Id. at 2285, 2289–90.
207. Id. at 2291, 2297 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
208. Id. at 2290 (majority opinion).
209. Id. at 2284.
210. Id. at 2284.
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analysis of the merchant side of American Express’s platform provided
it takes place in the proper rule of reason investigative sequence.211
To calculate both the benefits and costs of an internet ecosystem
intermediary’s commercial activities, governments and consumers alike
should assess what occurs both downstream and upstream. Looking at
one market side risks both false positives and negatives, the former likely
occurring when considering only subsidized and free rider content
access opportunities downstream and the latter likely occurring when
considering only the costs incurred by upstream participants.
Downstream impacts—particularly consumer welfare enhancements—
appear more easily identified and quantified.212 On the other hand,
upstream impacts are easily obscured as they occur behind the scenes213
and involve different types of participants, including many not keen on
having their actions detected.214 On this upstream side of the digital
intermediary, much harm can beset participants in the internet
ecosystem—and even non-participants are at risk.215 If Russian and
other provocateurs successfully interfered with the 2016 United States

211. Id. at 2290, 2296 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
212. See Calo & Rosenblat, supra note 203, at 1641–45 (providing examples of
identifiable downstream impacts).
213. With vastly improved data mining technologies, platform operators can exploit
asymmetries of information and power both upstream and downstream. For example,
“Uber’s ability to blur the boundaries between an accurate representation of real-time
supply (drivers) and a representation of general driver supply illustrates the potential
for deception to emerge in user interactions with the platform.” Id. at 1660 (noting
that because of the information asymmetry between users and Uber and the gap
between expectations, promises, and reality, “[w]hen issues of deception or other types
of problems emerge... it can be challenging to dissect which part of the problem is a
business practice, a technical issue, or a sociotechnical misunderstanding”); see also
Calo, supra note 78, at 1004–06.
214. See, e.g., Matthew T. Bodie et al., The Law and Policy of People Analytics, 88 U.
COLO. L. REV. 962, 988–90, 1038–39 (2017); Michal S. Gal & Niva Elkin-Koren,
Algorithmic Consumers, 30 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 309, 322–25 (2017); Kenneth A. Grady,
Mining Legal Data: Collecting and Analyzing 21st Century Gold, 20 J. INTERNET L. 1, 12, 19
(2017); Philip Hacker & Bilyana Petkova, Reining in the Big Promise of Big Data:
Transparency, Inequality, and New Regulatory Frontiers, 15 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 1,
15–16 (2017); Ramsi A. Woodcock, Big Data, Price Discrimination, and Antitrust, 68
HASTINGS L.J. 1371, 1386–87, 1393 (2017).
215. See Frank Pasquale, THE BLACK BOX SOCIETY: THE SECRET ALGORITHMS THAT
CONTROL MONEY AND INFORMATION 3, 20 (2015); Jonathan Taplin, MOVE FAST AND
BREAK THINGS: HOW FACEBOOK, GOOGLE, AND AMAZON CORNERED CULTURE AND
UNDERMINED DEMOCRACY 4 (2017).
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presidential election,216 then all citizens have a stake in upstream
market analysis irrespective of whether they participated in any
particular type of internet-mediated transaction such as receiving fake
news and other provocations from foreign agents keen on influencing
voters’ presidential choice.217
Broadband intermediaries have new and extraordinary ways to
monitor, surveil, collect, and sell subscriber data to purchasers whose
identity need not be disclosed.218 This changes the value position of
what the intermediary offers because the ability to “mine” subscriber
data has value that can provide a substantial and new revenue stream
for platform intermediaries, but only if subscribers ignore potentially
high costs they have to incur.219 Just as a court might overestimate
downstream harm to consumers absent an examination of
ameliorating upstream benefits, so too might a court overestimate the
level of downstream benefits of advertiser content subsidies absent
adequate consideration of the offsetting costs to consumers and society
from upstream data mining.220
Data mining can impose higher costs on consumers even considering
the possible joint benefit of better calibrated advertising placements.221

216. See Matt Apuzzo & Sharon LaFraniere, 13 Russians Indicted as Mueller Reveals
Effort
to
Aid
Trump
Campaign,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Feb.
16,
2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/16/us/politics/russians-indicted-muellerelection-interference.html; Mark Mazzetti & Katie Benner, 12 Russian Agents Indicted
in Mueller Investigation, N.Y. TIMES (July 13, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com
/2018/07/13/us/politics/mueller-indictment-russian-intelligence-hacking.html.
217. Ryan Lucas, FBI Direction Says Russia Still Seeking to Interfere in U.S. Democracy,
NPR (July 18, 2018, 10:45 PM), https://www.npr.org/2018/07/18/630337474/fbidirector-says-russia-still-seeking-to-interfere-in-u-s-democracy.
218. Brian Fung, What to Expect Now that Internet Providers Can Collect and Sell Your
Web Browser History, WASH. POST (Mar. 29, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
news/the-switch/wp/2017/03/29/what-to-expect-now-that-internet-providers-cancollect-and-sell-your-web-browser-history.
219. See B. Bodo et al., Tackling the Algorithmic Control Crisis—The Technical, Legal, and
Ethical Challenges of Research into Algorithmic Agents, 19 YALE J.L. & TECH. 133, 141 (2017)
(observing that subscribers have almost no insight into the transactions and
information flows on digital platform intermediaries).
220. See Frieden, supra note 22, at 320 (asserting that governments have often
overstated the generosity of short-term consumer benefits by failing to factor offsetting
privacy intrusions into their assessment of an intermediary’s market impact).
221. See, e.g., Michal S. Gal & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, The Hidden Costs of Free Goods:
Implications for Antitrust Enforcement, 80 ANTITRUST L.J. 521, 523 (2016) (noting that
while consumers may not have to pay a direct price for free goods, indirect prices and
other anticompetitive effects stemming from the provision of subsidized goods and
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If better targeting of advertisements constituted the only consequence
of data mining, then many participants would have confirmation that
the process in the aggregate constitutes a win-win proposition.222
However, data mining can impose significant privacy-invading, sinister,
and harmful costs on downstream consumers.223 Additionally, “winnertake-all” market dominance can create incentives for most consumers to
rely on a single venture unlike the incentives and ease in switching credit
cards to maximize benefits from any single transaction.224
If the potential harm from attempts to meddle in elections via social
networks appears too speculative, other more frequent and negative
impacts of data mining warrant consideration.
For example,
measurable consumer welfare and surpluses decline or evaporate
when vendors use data mining for dynamic pricing.225 Digital
intermediaries offer vastly improved opportunities for data mining to
enhance vendors’ understanding of the particular wants and needs of
consumers as well as their immediate elasticity of demand.226

services can be “overt or covert, in the same market . . . or in related markets, monetary
or non-monetary, and short-term or long-term”).
222. See Nathan Newman, The Costs of Lost Privacy: Consumer Harm and Rising
Economic Inequality in the Age of Google, 40 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 849, 867 (2014)
[hereinafter Costs of Lost Privacy] (recognizing that the use of user data for targeted
solicitations can be positive and mutually beneficial for vendors and users by helping
companies and interested customers find each other).
223. See, e.g., Natasha Singer, Just Don’t Call It Privacy, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 23, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/22/sunday-review/privacy-hearing-amazongoogle.html (describing the potentially deleterious consequences of data exploitation,
including “unequal consumer treatment, financial fraud, identity theft, manipulative
marketing and discrimination”).
224. Barnett, supra note 5, at 1876 (explaining that transaction cost savings derived from
using a single platform incentivize subscribers to utilize the same platform, resulting in
increased market dominance); see also Frank Pasquale, Beyond Innovation and Competition:
The Need for Qualified Transparency in Internet Intermediaries, 104 NW. U. L. REV. 105, 153
(2010) (providing the example of a social network user who wants to join another platform
but is reluctant to do so because of the “switching costs” involved in creating a new profile).
225. Ezrachi & Stucke, supra note 73, at 1780 (observing how online platforms employ
pricing algorithms based on user data to adjust prices for particular individuals in order to
optimize the profitability of each transaction); Newman, Costs of Lost Privacy, supra note 222,
at 867 (contrasting the benefits of tailored advertisements resulting from data mining with
the “darker version of online marketing,” where prices are fixed according to each
individual’s “pain point”—the maximum price he or she is willing to pay).
226. See Newman, Costs of Lost Privacy, supra note 222, at 870 (explaining how digital
intermediaries’ use of data mining to facilitate dynamic pricing has transformed the model
of online commerce and increased vendors’ reliance on consumer behavior analytics to
create a dispersion of prices aimed at extracting maximum revenue from each transaction).
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Largely unregulated transportation companies, not obligated to
provide service under a fixed tariff, can extract maximum revenues
based on data mining of current supply and demand.227 While
economists might welcome this practice as more efficient and rational,
consumers might consider the transaction unfair and exploitative.228
Dynamic pricing violates some consumers’ sense of fair play even if
such price discrimination is lawful and efficient.229
Consumers generally expect to pay the same advertised or listed price
and probably would not respond favorably if they came to understand
that data mining improves the ability of merchants to “size up” the
individual consumer and calculate a price aimed at eliminating any
consumer surplus.230 Consumers understand price differentials such as
volume discounts and delivery costs.231 Once informed that data mining
makes dynamic pricing more prevalent and effective, they might temper
their satisfaction with the subscription contract they passively accepted.
A.

A Complete and Thorough Assessment of Platform Costs and Benefits

Many consumers, judges, government regulators, and legislators do
not fully understand the tradeoffs occurring when digital broadband
intermediaries dominate market segments, including internet search,

227. See, e.g., Arwa Mahdawi, Is Your Friend Getting a Cheaper Uber Fare than You Are?,
GUARDIAN (Apr. 13, 2018, 12:39 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/comment
isfree/2018/apr/13/uber-lyft-prices-personalized-data (reporting on the ride-share
industry’s widespread use of dynamic pricing based on demand patterns).
228. See, e.g., Calo, supra note 78, at 1029–30 (“[D]igital market manipulation . . .
creates objective privacy harm when a firm uses personal information to extract as
much rent as possible from a consumer . . . . [T]he consumer is shedding information
that . . . will be used to charge her as much as possible . . . or to convince her in a way
that she would find objectionable were she aware of the practice.”).
229. See, e.g., James Surowiecki, In Praise of Efficient Price Gouging, MIT TECH. REV.
(Aug. 19, 2014), https://www.technologyreview.com/s/529961/in-praise-of-efficientprice-gouging (describing how Uber’s use of dynamic pricing has become a flash point
for criticism despite the reality that while customers may pay more, higher demand
increases supply and, as a result, more customers get a ride that otherwise would not
have been available).
230. See, e.g., Fei L. Weisstein et al., Effects of Price Framing on Consumers’ Perceptions of
Online Dynamic Pricing Practices, 41 J. ACAD. MKTG. SCI. 501, 501 (2013) (citing research
that has identified negative effects of dynamic pricing practices on consumers’
perceived fairness, trust, and repurchase intentions).
231. Ellen Garbarino & Olivia F. Lee, Dynamic Pricing in Internet Retail: Effects on
Consumer Trust, 20 PSYCHOL. & MKTG. 495, 498 (2003) (noting that consumers accept
some forms of price discrimination, including volume discounts, geographical variations,
and preferred treatment for certain demographic groups such as seniors and children).
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social networking, and internet-mediated, retail commerce.232 One
can readily appreciate the upside consumer benefits in having access
to advertiser-supported content and internet markets subsidized by
ventures willing to forego short-term profits for longer-term market
share and diversification.233 A more difficult undertaking calculates
what direct and indirect costs consumers incur, presently and in the
future, for the opportunity to access what a unicorn “freely” offers.234
Widely embraced economic doctrine favors a reluctance by
government to interfere with marketplace activities, particularly when
identifiable, near-term cost savings and other welfare enhancements
flow to consumers.235 However, it has become increasingly clear that
consumers have to contribute more value than what they might infer
from widespread promotion of “free” and subsidized access.236 That
insight occurs even with a cursory assessment of what transactions
occur on the upstream side of an intermediary’s market.237 The
platform must generate sufficient revenues to subsidize subscriber
232. Frieden, supra note 22, at 319–20 (attributing government actors’ lack of
understanding of such tradeoffs to their failure to keep pace with the speed of
innovation and the convergence of technologies and markets, as well as to the
difficulty in measuring or quantifying the full range of current and prospective market
and consumer impacts).
233. See, e.g., Morozov, supra note 64 (referring to the seemingly limitless nature of the goods
and services that could be subsidized by advertising or other data-based revenue streams).
234. See Gal & Rubinfeld, supra note 221, at 523 (noting, for example, the negative
effects on consumers if prices are raised once potential competition is eliminated);
Newman, Zero-Price Markets, supra note 16, at 179 (underscoring the difficulty posed by
comparing short-term direct consumer costs in zero-price markets where, in the
absence of a “fungible baseline of comparison like currency, customers are left to make
qualitative judgments about which product will cost the least amount of information”).
235. See, e.g., William E. Kovacic, The Intellectual DNA of Modern U.S. Competition Law
for Dominant Firm Conduct: The Chicago/Harvard Double Helix, 2007 COLUM. BUS. L. REV.
1, 4 (2007) (tracing limited government interference in the market to the influence
of an economic school of thought known as the “Chicago School”). See generally
ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF 7 (1978)
(arguing, as a leading proponent of the Chicago School, that the only legitimate goal
of antitrust is the maximization of consumer welfare).
236. See, e.g., Magali Eben, Market Definition and Free Online Services: The Prospect of
Personal Data as Price, 14 I/S: J.L. & POL’Y FOR INFO. SOC’Y 227, 230 (2018) (stressing
that internet intermediaries, despite offering consumers access to seemingly free
services, are not charities but for-profit companies).
237. See, e.g., Maureen K. Ohlhausen & Alexander P. Okuliar, Competition, Consumer
Protection, and the Right [Approach] to Privacy, 80 ANTITRUST L.J. 121, 132 (2015) (“Given
the intrinsic value of [consumer] data, digital platforms can monetize it in several ways,
including by using it internally to improve services or by selling it” to users on the other
side of the platform, such as advertisers or data brokers).
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access to goods and services without direct, out-of-pocket payments.238
For example, Google constantly conducts advertisement placement
auctions, the ample revenues of which subsidize its free services, such
as search, email, mapping, language translation, computer and
wireless handset operating systems,239 storage, and word processing.240
Digital platform subscribers need to know the consequences of
commodification of their consumer data, just as courts need to assess
the full impact of upstream and downstream transactions.241 In light
of the potential for upside benefits and downside costs, courts should
challenge the conventional wisdom that assumes intermediaries
massively enhance consumer welfare, and should expand scrutiny to
transactions on both sides of the platform.242 While consumers need
to exercise greater care, so too do government agencies and courts
having statutory responsibilities to assess the potential for consumer
harm and to establish safeguards.243
Regulatory agencies with jurisdiction to safeguard consumers and
reviewing courts should better calibrate the tools they use to investigate
the potentially harmful effects of platform intermediaries on
competition and consumers, with emphasis on the potential for privacy
intrusions, unfair trade practices, market concentration, subscriber
238. See id. (stating that in the absence of a monetary exchange between provider
and consumer, “monetized data . . . supports consumer access to an ever-expanding
selection of free, high-quality services and content, . . . much of which was previously
available only for a substantial fee”).
239. The European Commission determined that Google anticompetitively
leveraged its dominant market position in wireless handset operating systems by
requiring manufacturers to pre-install the Google Search app and browser app
(Chrome) as a condition for licensing Google’s app store (the Play Store), paying large
manufacturers and mobile network operators for exclusive pre-installation of the
Google Search app, and preventing manufacturers wishing to pre-install Google apps
from selling other mobile devices running on alternative versions of Android not
approved by Google. See European Commission Press Release IP/18/4581, Antitrust:
Commission Fines Google €4.34 Billion for Illegal Practices Regarding Android
Mobile Devices to Strengthen Dominance of Google’s Search Engine (July 18, 2018).
240. See, e.g., Nicas, supra note 99 (reporting that Google, in addition to running
millions of automated auctions to rank ads and decide how much advertisers pay, “is
one of the largest single buyers of its own search ads, meaning it frequently bids against
its [upstream] customers for spots atop its search results”).
241. See Katz & Sallet, supra note 124, at 2170–71 (observing that competitive
conditions and harms can manifest in different ways on opposite sides of a platform).
242. See Gal & Rubinfeld, supra note 221, at 554 (contending that an analysis that
focuses solely on the “free” product often leads to the simplistic conclusion that the
transaction creates only positive welfare effects).
243. Frieden, supra note 22, at 320.
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lock-in, and anticompetitive tactics.244 The goals for recalibration
should focus on acquiring a better understanding of platform operator
practices and their impacts rather than serve as a justification for more
intrusive government oversight.245
Such a holistic approach can better assess the costs and benefits
generated by platform intermediaries. It does not always support an
analysis on both market sides, but a thorough assessment provides
greater certainty in conclusions to concentrate solely on one side. For
example, the Supreme Court undertook an analysis of both market
sides of a dominant local newspaper and concluded that only the
downstream side mattered in Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United
States.246 In this case, the Court opted to focus solely on downstream
market effects, considering a newspaper platform as one-sided because
the impact of an alleged vertical restraint largely affected only one
side.247 The Court determined that requiring advertisers to buy
placements in both morning and evening editions of the newspaper
primarily benefitted consumers by increasing financial subsidies
available to them in the form of subsidized subscriptions and single
edition prices with only insignificant direct or indirect effects on the
local marketplace for newspaper advertisements.248
Regulatory agencies should bolster and enforce requirements that
digital intermediaries fully and transparently disclose the nature and

244. Cf. Cecilia Kang, F.T.C. Hearings Add to Efforts that Threaten Tech Industry, N.Y.
TIMES (Sept. 14, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/13/technology/ftchearings-technology.html (reporting that in the context of the Federal Trade
Commission’s decision to re-assess current competition laws and consumer
protections, some academics and consumer groups have called for regulators to
rethink the simplistic gauge of price as a measure of consumer welfare when evaluating
the effects of platform intermediaries).
245. See Frieden, supra note 22, at 314 (arguing that a better-calibrated assessment
of multi-sided market impacts “promotes a thorough and fair assessment without
favoring [government] intervention or forbearance”).
246. 345 U.S. 594 (1953).
247. Id. at 610 (concluding that the case only concerns the newspaper’s activity in
the advertising market, not in readership).
248. Id. at 621; see also Ohio v. American Express Co., 138 S. Ct. 2274, 2286 (2018)
(“To be sure, it is not always necessary to consider both sides of a two-sided
platform . . . . [I]n the newspaper-advertisement market, the indirect networks effects
operate in only one direction; newspaper readers are largely indifferent to the amount
of advertising that a newspaper contains.”). Hence, a preliminary two-sided market
analysis can avoid a finding of harm in a single market-side analysis by confirming that
pursuing that mode of analysis is appropriate for the specific evidentiary and legal
issues in question.
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scope of their data mining and sales to third parties. The European
Union has sought to identify and implement best practices in data
protection and transparency through its General Data Protection
Regulation (GDPR).249 While this comprehensive regulation may
overreach and impose excessive and costly procedural requirements,250
it does identify fundamental consumer rights worthy of protection and
enforcement.251 These include easier ways to know what data companies
hold about individuals, clear responsibility for organizations to obtain
informed consent before collecting information, timely disclosure of
data breaches, the right to secure corrections to inaccurate data, opt-out
opportunities, and an enforcement mechanism for violations.252
The GDPR offers additional consumer safeguards that might hamper
the business plans of digital intermediaries and advertiser-supported
access to content.253 These include the right to be forgotten—i.e., the
mandatory elimination of information about a person deemed nonrepresentative and potentially damaging and private, for example
information about prior criminal convictions, and other judicial
proceedings, such as a bankruptcy filing and revenge pornography.254
The GDPR also requires data portability that confers elements of an
249. Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of
27 April 2016 on the Protection of Natural Persons with Regard to the Processing of
Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data, and Repealing Directive
95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation), 2016 O.J. (L119) 1 [hereinafter
GDPR]. The GDPR became effective on May 25, 2018.
250. See, e.g., Matt Burgess, What is GDPR? The Summary Guide to GDPR Compliance
in the UK, WIRED (Oct. 4, 2018), https://www.wired.co.uk/article/what-is-gdpr-uk-eulegislation-compliance-summary-fines-2018 (detailing how the GDPR has overhauled
how internet intermediaries collect, store, process, and use data, by requiring updated
protection policies, consumer consent procedures, data protection impact
assessments, and systematic monitoring of data handling processes); Jeremy Kahn et
al., It’ll Cost Billions for Companies to Comply with Europe’s New Data Law, BLOOMBERG (Mar.
22, 2018, 1:01 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-03-22/it-ll-costbillions-for-companies-to-comply-with-europe-s-new-data-law (reporting that the 500
largest corporations will spend $7.8 billion to comply with GDPR).
251. GDPR, supra note 249, arts. 15–20, 2016 O.J. (L119) at 43–45 (establishing
essential data subject rights, including rights to access, rectification, erasure,
restriction of processing, and data portability).
252. Id. arts. 6, 12, 15–17, 33, 77–84, 2016 O.J. (L119) at 36–37, 39, 43–44, 52, 80–83.
253. See, e.g., Larry Downes, GDPR and the End of the Internet’s Grand Bargain, HARV.
BUS. REV. (Apr. 9, 2018), https://hbr.org/2018/04/gdpr-and-the-end-of-the-internetsgrand-bargain (signaling that GDPR implementation costs might push companies to
devise new business models, meaning the end of “the internet’s grand bargain: the
exchange of free or subsidized content for personalized advertising”).
254. GDPR, supra note 249, arts. 12, 15–17, 2016 O.J. (L119) at 39, 43–44.
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ownership right to consumers including the power to authorize transfer
of personal data from one data mining and analytics firm to another.255
These two safeguards present significant procedural and substantive
challenges and risk violating core constitutional values, such as press
freedom to research and disclose facts and property ownership rights.256
While the European Union may have overreached with the breadth,
scope, and business disruption presented by the GDPR, the United
States and other nations lag in consumer protection.257 A significant
minority of the Supreme Court expressed hostility toward any judicial
examination of both market sides served by a platform intermediary.258
At the very least, a complete forensic examination of market effects from
both sides makes sense given an understanding of what lurks upstream.
CONCLUSION
The value proposition presented by the diverse set of broadband
platforms requires consumers and governments to consider costs and
benefits generated by transactions occurring on both sides of the
intermediary’s market. Singular focus on just one of the two sides risks
an inaccurate finding, either a false positive that no anticompetitive or
consumer harm has occurred, or a false negative finding the absence
of problems even as they cause direct or indirect damage.259 Much of
the potential for actual or potential harm lies in the often-obscured
transactions between the digital platform and upstream data miners,
analysts and brokers, content providers, and advertisers.260 In this

255. Id. art. 20, 2016 O.J. (L119) at 45.
256. Data mining generates a work product controlled by the platform
intermediary. Data portability changes the characterization of the data by conferring
to consumers the right to control who has access to it. See Imanol Arrieta-Ibarra et al.,
Should We Treat Data as Labor? Moving Beyond “Free,” 108 AEA PAPERS & PROCS. 38, 39
(2018) (“We contend that the key aspect of the current political economy of data that
causes these problems is treating data as capital rather than as labor.”); see also ERIC A.
POSNER & E. GLEN WEYL, RADICAL MARKETS: UPROOTING CAPITALISM AND DEMOCRACY
FOR A JUST SOCIETY 208 (2018) (explaining that “[m]ost people do not realize the
extent to which their labor—as data producers—powers the digital economy”).
257. See, e.g., Adam Satariano, G.D.P.R., a New Privacy Law, Makes Europe World’s
Leading Tech Watchdog, N.Y. TIMES (May 25, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018
/05/24/technology/europe-gdpr-privacy.html.
258. Ohio v. American Express Co., 138 S. Ct. 2274, 2297 (2018) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
259. Id. at 2286 (majority opinion).
260. See, e.g., Bruce Schneier, Data Protection Laws Are Shining a Needed Light on a
Secretive Industry, GUARDIAN (June 1, 2018, 6:00 AM), https://www.theguardian.
com/commentisfree/2018/jun/01/gdpr-data-protection-laws-shine-light-industry
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often-murky place, much mischief and worse behavior can occur that
reduces or eliminates the benefits flowing downstream to consumers.261
The Supreme Court’s conservative majority appears to have
embraced relatively new economic doctrine supporting a netting of
competitive and consumer impacts on both sides of a digital platform
with an eye toward bolstering its baseline preference to support
corporate flexibility free of government oversight.262 However, doing
so has generated a new precedent that in application may not always
favor a libertarian outcome.
To be consistent, courts embracing a two-sided market analysis,
should be equally comfortable with two outcomes:
(1) the reversal of a false positive finding of anticompetitive harm by
factoring offsetting beneficial effects on consumers and competition
occurring on the other side of a platform; but also
(2) the reversal of a false negative finding of no anticompetitive harm
when factoring countervailing damage occurring on the other side of
the platform that a one-sided market analysis would have missed.263
Validating an examination of platform-generated benefits and
harms can help courts update increasingly suspect assumptions about
how markets work, particularly via digital broadband networks. Much
revered, so-called Chicago School marketplace assumptions and
antitrust prescriptions264 have become suspect,265 including the view
that rational commercial actors (such as Amazon) would never pursue
below market pricing in light of the unlikely opportunity of recouping
current losses in the future.266 Likewise, a laser focus on efficiency and
consumer welfare, as espoused by Robert Bork,267 may require a longer

(arguing that consumers cannot make informed buying choices without transparency as
to how upstream actors are securing and using consumer data).
261. See, e.g., id.
262. See Bert W. Rein, Insight: Ohio v. American Express: A New Conservative
Direction in Antitrust, BLOOMBERG L. (July 31, 2018), https://www.bna.com/insightohio-american-n73014481288 (“The majority, composed of justices viewed as
conservative, seems loathe to regulate specific commercial practices in markets that
appear to be adequately competitive overall.”).
263. See supra note 245.
264. See Posner, supra note 97, at 932; Daniel A. Crane, The Tempting of Antitrust:
Robert Bork and the Goals of Antitrust Policy, 79 ANTITRUST L.J. 835, 847 (2014).
265. See A New School in Chicago, ECONOMIST 10, 10 (2018) (reporting that the Chicago
School’s “monopoly of [antitrust] thought is itself being disrupted from within”).
266. See Jonathan B. Baker, Predatory Pricing After Brooke Group: An Economic
Perspective, 62 ANTITRUST L.J. 585, 586 (1994).
267. See BORK, supra note 235, at 7.
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timespan that considers whether immediate and easily measured,
short-term consumer welfare enhancements are partially or completely
offset in the longer-term, particularly in light of what can be discovered
with an evidentiary analysis of upstream transactional effects.268
Consumers and governments often cannot fully assess the consequences
of the growing importance of dominant platforms in the global
economy.269 Intentionally limiting the scope of forensic investigation to just
one of two market sides risks increasing the likelihood of an incomplete
assessment whether consumers and competition benefit or suffer from the
“centripetal pull of producers and consumers, and of users and advertisers,
toward dominant platforms.”270
Even the most popular and trusted platform operators, such as
Facebook, Google, Yahoo, and Twitter, have become unintentional and
unacceptably passive conduits for a toxic mix of “fake news,” identity theft,
disinformation, propaganda, defamation, extortion, and character
assignation.271 Reluctance among government agencies and courts to
examine upstream transactions and platform subscribers’ unwillingness
or inability to read and understand their service agreement combine to
create opportunities for people and ventures with bad intent to escape
detection and sanction.272 We may soon reach a point where the failure
to act may significantly reduce the value position in platform transactions
and the level of trust needed to support ever-expanding use.
If stakeholders in the internet ecosystem will not self-regulate and
sanction bad actors, government may have to intervene. For already
authorized involvement, such as antitrust law enforcement, courts
should recalibrate their relevant market definitions to include both
268. But see, e.g., Terrell McSweeney & Brian O’Dea, Data, Innovation, and Potential
Competition in Digital Markets—Looking Beyond Short-Term Price Effects in Merger Analysis, 2
CPI ANTITRUST CHRON. 7, 10 (2018) (referencing, in the merger context, the difficulties
involved in evaluating “competitive effects of a particular transaction with sufficient
accuracy and across a sufficiently long time horizon to justify antitrust intervention”).
269. See Pasquale, Two Narratives, supra note 81, at 315 (“For partisans of the sharing
economy, the shift from territorial governance (by elected representatives) to functional
governance (by firms) will result in a dynamic mix of corporate semi-sovereigns, all
jostling to better serve producers and consumers on each side of their platforms. But
that narrative is undermined by consolidation of digital platforms.” (footnote omitted)).
270. Id.
271. See, e.g., Issie Lapowsky, Facebook and Twitter’s Biggest Problems Follow Them to
Congress, WIRED (Sept. 5, 2018, 3:48 PM), https://www.wired.com/story/facebooktwitter-congress-testimony-dorsey-sandberg.
272. See, e.g., Charles Arthur, Internet Regulation: Is It Time to Rein in the Tech Giants?,
GUARDIAN (July 2, 2017, 4:30 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/
2017/jul/02/is-it-time-to-rein-in-the-power-of-the-internet-regulation.
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sides of an intermediary platform because transactions occurring on
either side have direct and indirect impacts on users both upstream
and downstream. Rather than violate case precedent and law, this
holistic approach updates the evidence-collection process to reflect
changes in how an increasing percentage of personal and commercial
transactions take place.

